MBD, I think the problem with that approach is:

1) If we think it’s in our strategic interest to stop Russia from gobbling up Ukraine, which I think it is, we wouldn’t want to make our level of support hostage to what the often-feckless Europeans are willing to do;

and 2) We couldn’t be guaranteed to calibrate our support at a lower level that would have been been more stinting but still keep Russia from making major gains that would have increased its appetite and/or risked a Ukrainian collapse.

Even in your alternative scenario, for instance, I imagine if Russia were on the verge of taking Kyiv, you’d have wanted to surge more weapons to keep Russia from simply achieving victory. If so, then your policy of limited support would have been out the window. And if that’s true, why wouldn’t you simply arm Ukraine now such that it can almost guarantee Russia won’t win, significantly degrade the Russian military, and retake territory to improve its position at the bargaining table?

I accept a number of your points, e.g., not talking about regime change, tracking funding, etc., but I think the bottom line is that if we were going to hold Russia at bay, we needed to do some version of what we have done. Now, as I’ve written before, I’m perfectly willing to use our leverage to pressure Ukraine in the right circumstances. I don’t believe we’re going to get there without stymying the Russians, though, and that requires a high level of material and financial support.