In response to my column , several readers have said something to the effect of “I agree with you on the ‘why’ on the wall, but what about the ‘where’? Isn’t the charge that this is a land grab a serious one? Won’t this give Israel a black eye in the world community?” Etc.

Because it’s my syndicated column, I didn’t have room to address this. I’m sure I’ll have time later. But for now I’d make two quick points.

First, Israel’s black-eye is permanent from the perspective of the “world community.” It’s existence is a black eye (See George Will’s column

today). So tailoring its foreign policy to look good to the UN is a truly pointless endeavor. After all, it followed the UN’s advice in its withdrawal from Lebanon and look at the trouble that got them.

Second, building the wall on the so-called “green line” would in effect reward terrorism by essentially agreeing to the 1967 borders without a negotiation. Israel would surely make that retreat as a reward for peace, but it can’t as a reward for violence.

Yossi Klein Halevi made this point very well in the November 10 New Republic (not on web):

The main objection to the fence, which is scheduled for completion in 2005, is that it doesn’t adhere to the pre-1967 green line but deviates “deep” into the West Bank. In fact, at most points, the fence either winds close to the green line or extends several miles over it without compromising Palestinian territorial contiguity–hardly the massive land grab warned against by opponents. So far, 108 miles of fence have been completed in the northwestern part of the West Bank, and about 1.5 percent of the West Bank has been incorporated into the Israeli side. If the fence is eventually extended to include Ariel–a town of 18,000 residents, which the Camp David negotiations included within the eventual borders of Israel–it will protrude, finger-shaped, about 15 miles into the territories. Yet even then the fence will encompass only a few percentage points of the West Bank. (The highest figure I’ve encountered is 10 percent.) And, note Israeli officials, the fence can be moved or even dismantled.
Still, that apologetic argument misses the point, which is that the fence must violate the green line. Building the fence on the 1967 border would play into the Palestinian strategy by creating the outlines of a de facto Palestinian state in all of the West Bank, without requiring the Palestinians to cease terrorism or genuinely recognize Israel. Building over the green line, by contrast, reminds Palestinians that every time they’ve rejected compromise–whether in 1937, 1947, or 2000–the potential map of Palestine shrinks. That message is the exact opposite of the left-wing trajectory of increased concessions under fire–from Camp David to Taba to Geneva. The fence is a warning: If Palestinians don’t stop terrorism and forfeit their dream of destroying Israel, Israel may impose its own map on them. Indeed, the fence is a reminder that the 1967 border isn’t sacrosanct. Legally, the West Bank is extraterritorial: The international community didn’t recognize Jordan’s annexation, and, because Palestine isn’t being restored but invented, its borders are negotiable.
The only justification for withdrawal to the green line is pragmatism. Most Israelis would accept an approximate withdrawal to the 1967 borders in exchange for genuine Palestinian acceptance of Jewish sovereignty on this land. Reinstating the green line, then, would be a reward for peace, not war. But what we’ve learned in the decade since Oslo began is that “land for peace” was never an option. At best, Israel was being offered land for a cease-fire. And that is hardly justification for returning to the precarious 1967 lines.