I very much think that the United States should see it through to stabilize Afghanistan, and that we now have our best shot to do just that with General Petraeus and General Mattis in charge. What Michael Steele said was unfortunate. Still, I don’t think he should resign. Let me explain.

Discussion about Afghanistan is necessary, since for too long we were trapped in an anti-Iraq-war narrative in which the 2007–8 campaign was the “good war,” as distinguished from the “bad” one in Iraq — only to see the latter quiet down and the former heat up. More importantly, we have not had any official explanation of a number of paradoxes about Afghanistan, although such clarification is essential to ensuring public support for the war:

Why — assuming we did take our eye off Afghanistan — were the cumulative American fatalities from 2001 to 2008 almost the same as those in the last 18 months, when we poured fresh money and troops into the theater?

Why did our losses begin to get much worse in mid- and late-2008, only to increase even more rapidly in 2009–10 — a time when radical-Islamic terrorists were all but defeated in Anbar province and Iraq was becoming almost quiet (e.g., three American dead in Iraq in December 2009, but 35 in Afghanistan)?

If radical Islam focused on both theaters, as we did, why would it be emboldened in Afghanistan by defeat in Iraq, while we were apparently demoralized by our victory?

Standard explanations ranging over many years are adduced, but we don’t hear much as to their relative cogency:

● We got lax and allowed the once-reliable Karzai to become too comfortable in traditional bribery and corruption.

● It took five to seven years for the Taliban to regroup in Pakistan and prepare for a rebound, and they were aided by more aggressive sympathy in a Pakistan that had lost its 9/11-era fear of an unpredictable and angry U.S.

● Our rules of engagement in Afghanistan changed (as we misread and misapplied what had worked in Anbar), and no longer could we assure supportive and potentially friendly populations that we would take out the bad guys among them who were preventing the better sorts from stepping up to promote civil stability.

● We ourselves were complacent in Afghanistan, thinking the war was about over; national attention turned to Iraq and did not notice the early warning signs of renewed trouble.

● There was a sense after November 2008 (even during the 2008 campaign) that a new administration would soon set withdrawal deadlines and begin to leave, encouraging the Taliban to step up and stick it out.

● The diplomatic effort waned in the closing months of the lame-duck Bush administration and then was bungled in 2009 by a Holbrooke-Eikenberry-McChrystal rivalry in which, at various times, the State Department was at odds with our military, the Karzai government, and itself.

● For all the world furor and strident liberal hatred Bush inspired, to our enemies he projected an image of unpredictability, resolution, and tough decision-making, which served as a kind of deterrence; for all the world happiness and strident liberal support inspired by Obama, to our enemies he projects an image of predictability, diffidence, and an avoidance of tough decision-making, which suggests detachment from the ground war in Afghanistan.

I don’t know to what degree these explanations have merit or to what particular years they should be applied, but I do know that few can answer the questions raised about Afghanistan. In that context, Michael Steele was probably (wrongly) trying to make political hay out of Obama’s dilemma. It was a bungled attempt, but that doesn’t mean he didn’t have a point, or that he should resign.

This is a strange war in which everyone repeats conventional wisdom but no one tells the public why Afghanistan seems like such a paradox. Until we do get a national clarification of what has been happening in Afghanistan, what our aims and objectives are, and how we are going to win, there will be more Michael Steeles awkwardly trying to make sense of it all.