I woke up early this morning and read Rich’s masterful cover story in the May 9 NRDT. Like his earlier “What Went Wrong,” this piece, “What Went Right,” is required reading for anyone who wants to understand what has been unfolding in Iraq – anyone who wants to understand how warfare is changing to confront America’s 21st Century enemies. (How telling, too, that you can find nothing on this level in the MSM.)

A few key points that deserve emphasis:

For years, Pentagon planners prepared to fight the Soviet Union on the plains of central Europe. They did not seriously prepare to fight terrorists and insurgents in places like Fallujah and Sadr City. One example: Tanks were built heavily armored in front–to face the enemy head on–but left vulnerable in the back. Insurgents in Iraq were not slow to figure this out. Another example: Humvees were not heavily armored because they were not meant to be used in battle, they were meant to be used in the rear. But in a “small war” there are no front lines and there is no rear.

Rich makes it clear that the military needed to learn not only how to fight differently but also how to think differently. Soldiers and Marines came to see that they were fighting a war of ideas as well as a war of weapons.

“We had a different understanding of the things that make you successful,” the commander of an armored division told Rich. “A crucial question was, What is our information campaign?” Rich elaborates: “So the information campaign came first and the military operation was supplementary to it.” Adds the commander: “We reversed the paradigm that we had lived with during my first 30 years in the Army.”

(When will the State Department undergo a similar paradigm shift in regard to the War of Ideas? Hopefully, when Karen Hughes and Dina Powell get there.).

Great, valuable piece. Congrats, Rich.