The Economist seems a little shocked that the far-left Syriza has (apparently) made a mess of its approach to Greece’s creditors:

Syriza has no excuse for making idle references to the Nazi occupation of Greece. Nor has it helped by playing games with its partners in the Eurogroup of finance ministers. European officials have been incensed by a Hellenic habit of leaking supposedly private discussion papers.
The wrangling over whether to extend Greece’s second bail-out, which expires on February 28th, has shown Mr Tsipras’s government at its worst. Admittedly Syriza was dealt a bad hand by its predecessor, which before Christmas accepted an extension of only two months. But rather than accept an extension, Mr Tsipras and Mr Varoufakis have dug in their heels, robotically insisting on a “bridging” deal that would unlock euro-zone funding while allowing the government to slow or reverse reforms. Greece’s creditors, unsurprisingly, were unimpressed. On February 19th Greece put forward a more conciliatory proposal to extend its loan. But this was almost immediately rebuffed by Germany. Trust has seemingly been so grievously eroded that Greek promises of discipline are not worth much in Berlin.
These spats matter far beyond the hurt feelings of a few politicians. Greece’s survival in the euro depends on two factors largely outside its control: the willingness of the ECB to keep its banks on life support, and that of the Eurogroup to strike a long-term financing deal (Mr Varoufakis avoids the term “bail-out”) to keep the country afloat. It has weakened its hand on both fronts.
The ECB’s reasoning will rest in part on its assessment of the health of Greek banks. Depositors are withdrawing around €2 billion ($2.3 billion) a week. Syriza’s stubbornness has hardened attitudes on the ECB’s council. On February 18th, it offered only a small increase in liquidity support; and the support will end entirely if two-thirds of its members say so. Some are reported to favour capital controls as a better option. Greece will be on perilous terrain if it enters March without a deal in place.
As for a long-term deal, Germany and others have dangled sweeteners before Greece, including an easing of debt terms and a lower primary-surplus target. But these are prizes to be won at the end of talks, not the beginning. Syriza has already started to reverse some reforms, including privatisations and collective-bargaining rules, antagonising its creditors further. The Eurogroup will probably not withdraw its fiscal offers but, with trust in the Greeks at zero, the reform conditions that it will attach to a third bail-out will surely be tougher than ever.
Time is short, particularly if the Eurogroup fails to agree with Greece on the terms for a bail-out extension. Thanks to a collapse in tax revenues, the government could run out of cash before an IMF bond falls due in March. By squeezing suppliers and raiding funds, Greece may be able to finance itself for a few months, but without further help it will certainly be unable to meet debt repayments to the ECB in July and August.

There are three key points that The Economist misses.

The first is that (whatever it may say) Syriza might prefer to see Greece out of the euro zone. Continued membership of the currency union could get in the way of what it has planned for Greece. But, as mentioned the other day, most Greeks want to stay in, both because they believe that it is the best way of defending the value of what remains of their savings and also out of the conviction that membership acts as a check on Greece’s perpetually dysfunctional governments. All that Syriza promises, after all, is a different brand of dysfunction. Stirring up a patriotic clash with the euro zone might give Syriza the mandate it needs to persuade voters to back Grexit. A conspiracy theory too far? Maybe, but it is worth noting that Syriza’s tough line is playing very well with Greece’s voters, if not its bank depositors.

The second is that German voters count too. And so do Estonian voters, Finnish voters and so on. The Economist argues that, “armed with a strong democratic mandate” Syriza is well placed to press for “a looser and fiscal monetary policy”. Well, Syriza’s mandate is a Greek mandate and in a system of pooled sovereignty that mandate does not count for as much as it should. Admittedly Greece could certainly find support (in France, say) for less austerity, but that still would not be enough to overcome opposition in other euro zone members or, for that matter, what’s left of the euro zone’s legal framework. If Greece does not like the rules of the currency club it joined, and it cannot manage to get those rules changed, it should quit.

The third is that the magazine fails to address the question of Grexit as an alternative.

As CNBC notes, others do not.

Hans-Werner Sinn, president of the Munich-based Ifo Institute for Economic Research [famously no great fan of the single currency], said Greece’s creditors needed to “face the truth” and realize the country is bankrupt and needs to undergo a devaluation in order to regain competitiveness.
“Going to the drachma is the only possibility I believe, because then the economy will be revitalized rather quickly,” Sinn told CNBC Thursday.
“We have to accept that as creditors and face the truth and reduce the burden to the Greek people,” he added.
He argued that the drachma—its currency before it adopted the euro—would help stimulate the country’s economy. For example, Greece would stop importing agricultural products from other euro zone countries if it were using the drachma because they would be more expensive, Sinn said.
“The people will go to their farmers and buy the products there, so there will be more jobs there,” he added. “Second, tourists will come back from Turkey and go to Greece.”
He added that Greeks who have transferred money abroad because of fears of capital controls would be more willing to bring it back to the country and buy cheaper real estate. This would lead to a construction boom and potentially a fillip for manufacturing too, the widely respected economist argued.

That last might take more optimism than would have been the case a year ago. Even with the ‘right’ currency, the thought of a Syriza-run government in charge is likely to frighten off quite a few investors.

Meanwhile it’s important to remember that decision-making by crisis is standard Brussels operating procedure. Talks continue. Don’t assume Grexit just yet.