I’m still reading up, but someone in the WMD analysis business sent me this:

Jonah,
Here are some initial thoughts on the announced North Korea talks announced in today’s WashPost:
Portions of the deal seem to be reminiscent of the 94 agreement, regarding fuel oil assistance and the reintroductions of inspectors to the DPRK reactors and other sites associated with the nuclear program. While the heavy fuel oil as part of economic, energy and humanitarian assistance also harkens back to the 94 deal, it should be remembered that from a North Korea perspective, the US reneged on the 1994 deal, thus in their minds justifying their resurgent nuclear program.
The agreement seems to go farther however with Banco Delta Asia, which has long been suspected of being the DPRK’s primary bank for their external criminal operations in East Asia. Does this mean that the US is willing to allow the DPRK to continue its criminal activities in exchange for a nuclear rollback? Other additional concessions on the US part are stopping the US Trading with the Enemy Act and listing DPRK as a terror state, small but important issues. In many ways, this indicates that the US may tacitly be willing to accept North Korea as a rogue state. While these concessions by the US are certainly larger, they may perhaps be worth a complete DPRK nuclear rollback. Interestingly though, the article says: “left for further negotiations the question of what to do with North Korea’s declared nuclear weapons, estimated at a half-dozen bombs, and a stockpile of perhaps 50 kilograms of plutonium. In addition, it postponed discussions on a separate highly enriched uranium program”. Without question, DPRK would ask for further concessions from the US in exchange for dismantlement of the constituted weapons and the 50 kg of Pu (enough for 6 or so tactical bombs, depending on design efficiency). About the only thing that they would be asking for that is big to them outside of the economic realm is the US recognition of the North Korean state and the signing of a peace treaty (which the report indicates will now be up for discussion). DPRK has been asking this for years, and has been one of Kim’s primary desires (Kim could see it as being his “legacy”: either get nuclear weapons, or use them to get the treaty and recognition that his father never achieved).
I’m extremely pessimistic about the opportunities for a successful North Korean rollback, but I’ve probably adjusted my odds after this development. Instead of it being a 20-1 chance, I’m willing to concede that it is a 5-1 chance.
v/r
(name withheld)