Continuing the discussion from yesterday, an email:
โ1. Why did Jefferson replace โpropertyโ with โpursuit of happinessโ? Historians usually attribute the alteration to a widespread awareness that โpropertyโ was a colonial euphemism for โslavery.โ Had the Continental Congress proclaimed the purpose of government the preservation of life, liberty, and slavery, the document would have lost something of its rhetorical force, no?
โ2. More seriously, I think [Andrew] Sullivan is widely off the mark in suggesting that the Founders were indifferent to the governmentโs role in cultivating virtue. To a one, they subscribed to the logic of classic republicanism, which held that liberty could only be maintained by a virtuous people. (It held as a corollary that the only reliable means of safeguarding virtue was the cultivation of religious piety, but thatโs another matter for another time.) They believed that local governments were best positioned to cultivate the moral sentiments necessary for republican governance, but they werenโt averse to seeing the national legislature take on the task within its proper domain โ specifically, in the federal territories. Recall, for example, Article 3 of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which stipulated that โReligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.โ
โThereโs a lot more to say about this; I could go on for pages and pages. Suffice it to say, I think that Sullivanโs interpretation canโt bear the weight of overwhelming historical evidence to the contrary.โ
RP: This is all very interesting, as was the discussion yesterday, and I thank the correspondent. I think that the bit there about religion and morality โbeing necessary. . . to the happiness of mankindโ gets you part of the way (but only part of the way) to an answer to my original questionsโwhich were, again, whether we can identify a particular view of โhappinessโ among the Founders and whether that view included a moral component (whether, that is, they regarded happiness not just as satisfaction but as something closer to justified satisfaction).






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