You’re right, Kathryn. Nicholas Eberstadt tells the truth today in an important Op-Ed in The Washington Post. North Korea is not going to give up its nuclear weapons program. The most we’ll get out of Kim Jong Il is a bogus promise to disarm. These negotiations are an exercise in self delusion. The last obstacle to a deal mentioned by Eberstadt is the most important–verification. “…for North Korea as it exists today a foolproof independent verification regime would be barely distinguishable from outside military occupation.” In other words, the Koreans would have to give American inspectors free run of their vast series of underground military sites to insure compliance with any agreement. That would be tantamount to regime change, and Kim Jong Il would never agree to it. We still don’t even know where North Korea’s secret uranium processing facility is, even though we know it exists. That’s how well they are able to hide things. Eberstadt ends with this: “None of the options Washington and its allies face in North Korea is pleasant–but the time has come to face them squarely and without diplomatic illusion.” What are those options? We can try to pressure the Chinese to force regime change, but the Chinese will not act unless they are convinced that America will otherwise go to war with North Korea. We can interdict North Korean shipping and trade in hopes of reducing their exports of nuclear materials. But enough is bound to get through to eventually lead to a nuclear blast in some American city. And the interdiction itself, if it is reasonably effective, may lead to war. Finally, we can go to war with North Korea. I have said for some time, and still believe, that war is the likely outcome. The administration will negotiate, but the negotiations will break down when it becomes clear, as it inevitably will, that the North will not allow effective verification. Meanwhile, during the drawn out negotiations, the North Koreans will continue to develop their nuclear weapons. Once the failure of the negotiations has become obvious, we will be on a path to war, either in the short or medium term. We will intensify interdiction, pressure the Chinese to force regime change, and hope that a bomb doesn’t get through. But at some point, if China doesn’t act, and the extent of North Korea’s nuclear development becomes obvious, we will be pushed into war. The best hope to avoid war is a credible enough threat of it that China finally acts. But the odds still favor war.