From another reader:

S/he wrote:
“Science, as such, is not an object of science.
You can’t see it, hear it, taste it, touch it, smell it, measure it, weigh
it, or bottle its essence and test its characteristics under laboratory
conditions.”
I say:
Science is the activity of scientists (data collection, experiments, etc.)
and the results of that activity (journal articles, presentations at
conferences, etc.). All of that is observable. What exactly is this
mysterious intangible True Essence of Science (“Science, As Such”) supposed
to be, somehow over and beyond the sum total of the real-world activity of
scientists?
S/he wrote:
“It is therefore not the task of science to recognize and define the
boundaries of science. This is a job for metaphysics (the study of
non-physical realities) and epistemology (the study of how we know what we
know). Both of these are elements in the philosophy of science. Without a
sound philosophy of science, scientists don’t know when they’ve crossed the
boundaries of their discipline and begun speaking as humanists.”
I say:
Scientists don’t get to say what does and doesn’t count as science? They’re
supposed to leave that to philosophers? Without the help of philosophers,
scientists can’t even tell when they’ve stopped doing science? Sorry, this
is risible. Try running it past any working scientist and see what response
you get.
Scientists form a working community that, among other things, trains
upcoming practitioners in how to do science. That necessarily includes
passing along the standards of the scientfic community as to what is and
isn’t scientific work, as determined by those who actually do it for a
living. The advice of philosophers is not required, though what philosophers
have to say about science may be of interest — mainly to other
philosophers.
In general, the idea that intellectual pursuits are somehow not legitimate
or complete until they have been given an explicitly articulated
philosophical foundation that somehow guides the practice is silly, and is a
conceit probably not even that widespread among philosophers any more. The
later writings of Wittgenstein go a long way towards demolishing it.