John. We can agree to disagree about whether it is wise to seek another deal with Syria. Perhaps our disagreement comes down to whether we see Syrian motivations as tactical or sincere. At any rate, Rich pointed out yesterday that it takes two to tango and Syrians don’t show any desire.

[You]: But diplomacy is all judgment calls. That’s why we have an expensively-educated, extravagantly-paid diplomatic corps. If they can’t do noblesse oblige, let’s get rid of them and hire some who can.

[Me]: You hit the nail on the head.

[You] …You are saying: “We’ve made some really dumb deals, and so have the Europeans. So let’s make no more deals.”

[Me] No, that’s not what I’m saying. Sometimes deals are possible, and sometimes they are not. But, we shouldn’t be so eager for a deal that we make matters worse. We shouldn’t be afraid to walk away from the table. As a tangent, why is it that U.S. officials are so keen for a deal that passes the UN Security Council that, if we don’t think we have the votes, we just obfuscate with process. What’s wrong with going to the UNSCR about Iran or Syria and have Russia, China, or France veto? Let them show their cards and declare that they find a nuclear Iran acceptable. At least then we’d be dealing with reality rather than a diplomatic mirage.

[You] What “friendship with Washington” actually “means” for leaders in the Muslim ME is acute danger from their own people, big swathes of whom detest the USA?

[Me] Friendship with Washington means not hosting or financing terror, and not working to undercut our interests. We don’t need to subsidize broad swathes. I’m not sure, frankly, that the level of our aid to Cairo is worth it. At the same time, we should be cultivating states like Mali, not ceding her to the Saudis and Libyans. But, the problem of the U.S. ignoring our allies goes deeper. Just ask any Pole, Czech, or Slovak about our failures to keep promises made before they joined the Coalition of the Willing.

[You] Who, actually, are our significant adversaries in the ME? I would say: (1) the govt. of Iran, and (2) the transnational Islamist terror gangs, with their infrastructure of madrasas etc. For the rest, I’d be willing to cut deals (as we successfully have with Pakistan and Egypt, neither of which is exactly a poster child for parliamentary democracy).

[Me] This may be the core of our disagreement: I would classify the Syrian government as up their as among our significant adversaries. Bashar al-Assad is a Western-educated doctor, but only in the same spirit as Papa Doc Duvalier.

[You] Real deals, carrot-and-stick deals, with guaranteed enforcement, not dumb Clintonian or Euro-weenie paper-tiger deals. No argument from me on that.

[Me] One of the best carrots is simply no stick. Middle Eastern rogues took notice when Bush ended the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Baathist regime in Iraq. They might not like us, but they’d have to accommodate our desires, not the other way around. We’ve since lost our credibility again, which makes diplomacy far less likely to be successful.

(1) As an aside, it’s interesting to look back on the 1997 cable reporting the State Department’s negotiations with the Taliban. Note how the Assistant Secretary delegated terrorism to an underling rather than make it his priority. Hindsight only highlights the insincerity of Taliban promises.

(2) Saliba Sarsar’s recent study of U.S. efforts in the Arab world is thought-provoking. His conclusion:

“Policymakers should take a more nuanced approach. The U.S. government might, for example, evaluate the current state of democracy in each Arab country using measurements such as the status of democracy index. They might then tie aid and relations to the ability of Arab governments to achieve country-specific goals by certain times. At present, Saudi Arabia receives a status of democracy score of just 4. Perhaps Washington might tie its assistance to Riyadh on the Saudi kingdom’s ability to score an 8 within five years. Likewise, the Pentagon might demand that its assistance to Tunisia be tied to that regime’s ability to score an 11 rather than a 9. Washington should base its relations with Arab states on concrete and transparent democratic improvements.