Let me chime in for a second, Rich. Tracinski penned a thoughtful article, but I disagree with a few points. If George W. Bush sticks to his declaration that he will not “tolerate” a nuclear-weapon capable Iran, then military force may ultimately be necessary. But, the negatives associated with military force are real; they should only be a last resort. The critics who point out what Tehran might do in response are not picking their concerns out of a hat—they are real, as anyone who has studied Iranian history or past Iranian actions know. What a military strike against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities would accomplish would be delay of the program. But, absent a comprehensive U.S. strategy to take advantage of the additional time bought, the delay would only be kicking the can down the road resolution of a larger problem. No administration should order an Operation Desert Fox-type strike on Iranian facilities just to allow itself more time to avoid taking leadership decisions. That would be the ultimate abuse of the men and women in the U.S. armed forces.

What I was trying to highlight in the New York Daily News column Tracinski references is that we have many robust options not yet tried. Would these have had more cumulative effect if we had begun them six years earlier? Yes. Do we have enough time for them to work? I don’t know. Might military force still be needed? Yes. And while I do not believe Tehran sincere in its diplomacy for reasons outlined here, to take a more forceful stance against the Islamic Republic will only enhance the U.S. position no matter what the administration chooses. There is a pattern in the administration and among analysts to do nothing while arguing whether Option A, B, or C is best. But, if A, B, and C, are not at cross-purposes, why not implement them simultaneously? Lastly, when discussions of this sort occur, it’s easy to conflate analysis with advocacy. Discussing the possibility of a military strike on Iran does not mean one wants it to happen. Nor does discussion of alternative courses of action mean that military options should be off-the-table.