I’m not inclined to be quite as tough on Brooks’s column as Andy and Mark are, but I am skeptical.

My first reaction to the column–beyond noting that Brooks appears to have gotten a rather nice scoop here–was to think that the deal Reid allegedly outlined might be worth taking, or at least starting negotiations over. (Whereas the deal, as it was initially described, sounded terrible.) My second reaction, though, was that there are (as Andy and Mark suggest) reasons for distrusting Reid. He was (again, reportedly) unwilling to guarantee no filibusters for the next Supreme Court nominee in public because he fears liberal interest groups. But will he fear them less when there’s an actual fight going on about a Supreme Court nominee? The proposal only makes sense if you assume that Reid was going to be non-committal, or even supportive of a filibuster in public, while telling a few Democratic senators to vote the other way. And how does Reid propose to protect these Democratic senators from the left? Would he allow them to explain that Reid had given them a pass? I just don’t see how the secrecy of this abortive deal could be made to work.

Which brings me to Brooks’s larger point about how populism has gotten rid of the back-room deal: I’m afraid that the very conservative temper that he means to vindicate here tells against him. Brooks wants our politicians to be statesmen who can fit their principles to the circumstances in which they find themselves. But among the circumstances they confront is that modern politics has a highly public and (relatedly) ideological character. The cameras aren’t leaving the Senate. The scope for dealmaking is reduced. There is a lot lost in moving to an ideological politics, and one can certainly sympathize with Brooks’s nostalgia. But that doesn’t make it a constructive basis for action.