Writing in the FT, Gideon Rachman argues that the EU is in such a state of crisis that Brexit “could . . . be a major step along the road to its collapse,” something, he argues, that would not be in Britain’s interest:
Britain cannot isolate itself from the troubles of Europe. In its own interests, it must contribute to the stability on the European continent. For the past 50 years, the EU has been crucial to underpinning peace, prosperity, diplomatic dialogue and the rule of law within Europe. It would be a serious mistake for the UK to undermine an organisation that, whether we realise it or not, is crucial to Britain’s own security.
I’m not convinced.
Yes, the EU is facing some severe difficulties at the moment: Rachman cites three — immigration, the sluggish euro-zone economy and the rise of populist opposition. But to suggest that these represent an existential threat is an exaggeration. As a post-democratic structure, the EU is able to weather storms that elected governments cannot (Exhibit A: the euro crisis). That lack of democratic legitimacy may ultimately make the union very brittle, but not, I reckon, just yet. It won’t be pretty, but the EU will muddle its way through the current morass for now. There’s also the awkward fact that all three of the problems identified by Rachman have been made far worse by a European integration process that has gone too far, too fast, and without the necessary democratic consent. Sadly, there are few signs that that will change. There are no signs that Britain would be able to make much of a difference to “ever closer” union by remaining within it: Brussels is what it is.
But there is an argument that Britain should hope that the EU would not survive Brexit.
Take a look at this article by John Hulsman in City A.M. He is describing a session in which Open Europe “war-gamed” a Brexit.
Here’s an extract:
The more intellectual aspect of this was the common European position that post-Brexit dealings with the UK must be made as difficult as possible. It was commonly agreed – to the surprise of Lord Lamont – that Britain must not be seen to prosper after the break-up as, if it were to do so, others would surely follow it out of the EU, which would be the end of the dream of all those European leaders present. For the European elite sees Brexit as about the future of Europe, far more than the future of Britain. As such, while there might be room for working together on military, intelligence, and strategic matters, there would be no deal whatsoever over the vital question of services, the mainstay of the UK economy.
That was the rational, if surprising, policy conclusion. However, the ill feeling went far deeper, following Lord Lamont’s entirely (to Anglo-Saxon ears) throwaway line about the euro having undoubtedly proven a disaster. For a minute, I thought all nine European players might well leap across the sturdy table that separated us, and throttle the startled British player themselves.
Entirely unwittingly, Lord Lamont had grabbed the European jugular; he had called into question the European elite’s religious view that the EU is the future, whereas most of the rest of us look at it as the past. After years of negligible growth, and faced with two existential crises confronting it at the same time (over the euro and refugees), it is factually easy to see why the British player said what he did. But facts alone do not rule the world. With their masks off, the project itself called into question, Europe’s leaders made it clear that they still yearn for and believe in a united, politically-intertwined Europe that simply will never successfully exist. To not believe this dogma is to be a heretic, and treated as such.
If Hulsman’s broader point is right — that the EU’s post-Brexit dealings with Britain would be essentially hostile — then the UK should hope that its departure did trigger at least a partial dissolution of the rest of the EU. Yes, that increases the risk of instability in Europe, although I would not overstate by how much: If anything, it is the EU that has been a destabilizing force of late.
And if (as Rachman, thinking of the way that the Britain has been drawn into earlier European conflicts, suggests we do) we look to the past for guidance as to what Britain should be worried about in Europe, the development of a large, unfriendly continental bloc is near to the top. And if someone argues that the way to head off that danger is to remain in the EU, the best reply should be that attempts to protect British interests from within the EU have in recent years not got it very far. That’s not going to change.
Better off out.