Recent moves in Estonia suggest Moscow still believes that its law should hold sway in lands it no longer controls.
A month or so after the Russians occupied Crimea in 2014 and started their war in Ukraine’s east, I was in Riga, the Latvian capital. Naturally enough, people were alarmed by signs that Russia was again on the march, although reassured by the protection offered by Latvia’s NATO membership. I asked one Latvian official (an ethnic Russian, as it happens) what it was like to have Russia next door. He replied that the key to understanding Putin was to think of him as a petulant and badly behaved teenager who likes to provoke, prod, and see what he can get away with. As I wrote back then:
For quite some time now, that’s what Russia has been doing in the Baltic. Planes skim and sometimes cross borders. Military exercises are staged that seem intended to intimidate rather than to train. Last year saw some 70,000 Russian and Belarusian troops war-gaming a scenario in which “Baltic terrorists” were the villains.
Now, of course, Russia is engaged in full-scale war in Ukraine. However, Moscow was never likely to stop testing the Baltics, and it has not. A few months ago, there was the “mysterious” episode in which a gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia was damaged (just in time for winter) as were two telecommunications cables, one between Sweden and Estonia, the other between Finland and Estonia. Possibly the culprit was a Chinese ship, but if it was, the best guess is that it was acting as a proxy for its Russian ally/vassal.
Now this (via Politico):
Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas claimed on Tuesday that the country’s security service had broken up a Russian hybrid operation.
The operation involved damaging property and defacing monuments, including an attack on the car of Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets and a vehicle belonging to Andrei Šumakov, editor of news website Delfi. . . .
State Prosecutor Triinu Olev said 10 people had been arrested, including both Russian nationals and dual Russian-Estonian citizens; six remain in custody.
The Russian operation aimed to spread fear and create tension in Estonian society but failed to do so, the Estonian Internal Security Service stated.
Not the biggest deal, but interesting nonetheless.
Meanwhile (via Reuters):
Russian police have put Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, Lithuania’s culture minister, and members of the previous Latvian parliament on a wanted list for destroying Soviet-era monuments, according to the Russian interior ministry’s database.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Kallas was wanted for the “desecration of historical memory.”
Russian state agency TASS said the Baltic officials were accused of “destroying monuments to Soviet soldiers,” acts that are punishable by a five-year prison term under the Russian criminal code.
I wrote about the (long overdue) destruction of some Soviet monuments in the Baltics here and here. Quite why Latvians and Estonians should have had to walk by monuments celebrating their own subjugation by Soviet occupiers escapes me. It’s worth adding that during the Soviets’ long occupation of the Baltic States they destroyed most monuments commemorating the Baltic trio’s inter-war independence. That Soviet vandalism included the destruction of Baltic soldiers’ graves. By contrast, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have (rightly) almost always left Red Army graves untouched. Estonia’s most controversial Soviet war memorial, the “bronze soldier” that used to stand in downtown Tallinn, was moved to the city’s military cemetery, along with the bodies of some Red Army soldiers buried near him (some were reclaimed by family members and buried in Russia).
It’s telling that Kallas and the others face prosecution for the destruction of Soviet monuments in their own countries. Clearly Moscow still believes that its law should hold sway in lands it no longer controls.
As a practical matter, this move by Russia will have little effect, although those on the wanted list who do not enjoy diplomatic protection might want to avoid any countries that might be willing to extradite them.
Mainly, however, Russia’s move is just designed to apply a little more pressure.
Meanwhile the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service has issued its latest (public) report on international security and Estonia. It includes discussion of the military reforms announced in Russia in 2022.
Some extracts (emphasis added):
The objectives of Russia’s military reform reflect the leadership’s vision of the resources required for the conflict with Ukraine and prolonged confrontation with the West.
Russia presents its military reform as a response to NATO’s expansion, probably anticipating a possible conflict with the alliance within the next decade.
Russia’s goal is to achieve military dominance in the Baltic Sea region. For Estonia, Russia’s military reform entails a significant increase in Russian forces near the Estonian border in the coming years.
Those plans will be accelerated should Ukraine fall or be forced to sue for peace.