Start Spreading the Nukes, Part 2

In March last year, I wondered whether increasing European alarm about the reliability of the U.S. military guarantee to NATO members might lead more of them (beyond France and the U.K.) to start manufacturing their own nuclear weapons.

As I noted then:

Germany’s likely new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, would prefer to team up with France. However, the French presidential election is due in 2027 and, for a mix of reasons, ranging from suspicion of Germany to fondness for Putin, neither Marine Le Pen’s RN nor France’s far left would, to Berlin, be reassuring guarantors. On the other hand, how would Poland (another potential new nuclear power, although cost and timing make that unlikely for now) react if Germany secured its own nuclear weapons? Europe cannot escape its history.

The best guess, I reckoned, was that Germany would opt for “nuclear latency,” which is to say to put in place everything it needed for nukes without actually building them.

Over in Asia I thought that Japan, which is far closer to nuclear latency, might get to that point too, and likewise South Korea.

I returned to this topic in November, looking in particular at Poland and South Korea. I concluded that

how the U.S. handles its attempt to end Russia’s war against Ukraine is bound to be read as an indicator of its willingness to stand by its guarantees to countries with which it has treaty obligations. For now, that is not a reassuring thought.

The New York Post (January 26):

Berlin is considering developing its own atomic weapons to bolster Europe’s nuclear umbrella and the US’s own stockpile in the region, according to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

Speaking before the German parliament Thursday, Merz said the country is in talks with its partner nations on the possibility of extending Europe’s nuclear arm, which currently involves Britain and France as the sole nations in the continent with atomic weapons.

“These talks are taking place,” Merz said, adding that the discussions were only in their initial phase.

Katja Hoyer (February):

“We could build an atomic bomb within three years,” scientist Rainer Moormann told the German press this week. He was asked questions about that in the first place because something truly remarkable is happening in Germany: there is serious talk of the country developing its own nuclear weapons. . . .

Brigadier General Frank Pieper told the press this week, “Germany needs its own tactical nuclear weapons,” and fast. “Wake up and get working on it,” he encouraged Berlin.

That this is happening in a country that scrapped its nuclear power stations because Angela Merkel, #scientist, went along with popular superstitious dread about nuclear energy is remarkable. More remarkable still is that Joschka Fischer, a Green and a former German foreign minister, also supports a “European” nuclear deterrent.

But how would that work?

A credible nuclear deterrent is the best way to avoid nuclear war, but credibility is achieved when a potential aggressor believes that the other side will press the button — and quickly. Could “Europe” devise a system where that would be a believable possibility?

On the other hand, Germany is bound by two agreements — the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the treaty that allowed for the reunification of Germany — not to enter into this area, a prohibition that could perhaps be muddled by some sort of joint accord.

Meanwhile, via Breaking Defense (January):

Sweden has had very early discussions with France and the United Kingdom about possible nuclear weapons cooperation, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson has revealed.

No concrete proposals or timelines for any cooperation were outlined, and Kristersson emphasized that talks remain preliminary in early stages. But his remarks to Sweden’s public broadcaster SVT mark a notable shift in tone on the sensitive issue in Sweden of nuclear deterrence in Europe.

There is some (fairly ancient) history that suggests that building a Swedish nuclear weapon could take rather less time than might be thought, if not as little as once appeared possible.

The London Times (September):

By 1957 the CIA concluded that Sweden had “a sufficiently developed reactor programme to enable it to produce some nuclear weapons within the next five years”. Eight years after that, analysts assessed that the country was only six months away from building a bomb.

One of the reasons why Sweden did not proceed further with the program was informal guarantees — the country was not then in NATO — that the U.S. would stand behind it. These were guarantees the country felt it could trust.

Sweden is in NATO now, but how much of that trust remains?

Reuters (December):

Japan reaffirmed its decades-old pledge never to possess nuclear weapons on Friday after local media reported that a senior security official suggested the country should acquire them to deter potential aggressors.

The unnamed official said Japan needed nuclear weapons because of a worsening security environment but acknowledged that such a move would be politically difficult, public broadcaster NHK and other outlets reported, describing the official as being from Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s office. . . .

There is a growing political and public willingness in Japan to loosen its three non-nuclear principles not to possess, develop or allow nuclear weapons into its territory, a Reuters investigation published in August found.

Arms Control Today (December):

U.S. President Donald Trump pledged support for South Korea to enrich uranium and separate plutonium, a move Seoul says is necessary to advance its civil nuclear program.

But South Korea’s acquisition of those capabilities would also give the country the ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, raising the risk of proliferation at a time when there is an active debate in Seoul over the value of a national nuclear deterrent.

And from a post I put up last month:

At the end of December, the EU Commission, the Financial Times reported, published a notice clarifying what types of defense investment met its “sustainability” requirements. Some confusion had been created by an imprecisely defined prohibition on “controversial weapons.” According to the FT’s Bryce Elder, the “vagueness was unhelpful for the EU’s target to raise €800bn in defense investments over four years.” “Controversial” was replaced by “prohibited,” a category that comprises personnel mines, cluster munitions, biological and chemical weapons, but not companies that handle white phosphorous or depleted uranium or . . .

Wait for it.

“Atomic bombmakers get a pass.”

Coincidence?

Meanwhile, via the New York Times (January 8):

The Russian Defense Ministry said on Friday that it had struck western Ukraine with a nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile, an ominous warning by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia as U.S.-led negotiations to end the war have gained steam.

The attack was only the second time in the war that Moscow had fired that type of missile, known as the Oreshnik. The choice of western Ukraine — near the border with Poland, an E.U. and NATO member — as the target seemed intended to send a message to Europe as it strongly backs Kyiv in the settlement talks.