In the national acrimony over the cart of a political solution in Iraq versus the horse of military security, it is often forgotten that from April to July 2003 there was relative postbellum security in Iraq, well before the elections and while the occupation was desperately trying to restore services and utilities.

Why? There was still the fear and respect for the lethality of the U.S. military that had taken out Saddam in three weeks and might do the same to any who tried to restart the war.

Two things then happened, in that first brief lost window: the political, economic, and social reform necessary to starve the nascent insurgency of popular support in and outside of Iraq stalled, and second, we turned to reactive policing, under the glare of the international media, rather than ruthlessly killing the terrorists — and so insidiously lost the fear and respect from our enemies gained in the war. In a war imbued with symbolism withdrawing from Fallujah or giving Sadr a reprieve was nearly fatal to the notion of Western lethality.

This is not ancient history or a game of gottcha, but has some value for our present crux, since it reminds us that in a war of counter-insurgency the political solution must be contemporaneous with military operations that destroy and humiliate the insurgents.

Only that way do the vast majority of indifferent citizens not only see greater prosperity and security by allying with the new government, but also nothing but death and destruction should they join the terrorists and militias. So while we restart the political process by insisting on greater Sunni participation, and hope we can fund more job-creating industry and commerce, we must be merciless to those who would derail all this.

If we have a surge, that means sending combined Iraqi-American units on proactive operations to destroy the terrorists and their supporters. If we don’t, then the additional numbers will only offer bigger targets and added prestige to the terrorists who operate despite increased American investment.

I don’t think it is wise for supporters of the surge, to backtrack and call it a “bump” or to suggest it is not really that big of a deal. In the current political climate, whatever the actual numbers, it will take on a sort of crossing of the Rubicon: if it fails, it will bring the entire Iraqi operation to a close with Democratic cut-offs, in the manner of 1974-5, of funding for the war. So we need to see the surge not in terms of manpower, but as a refinement of tactics and strategy favoring the offensive that requires more troops for success. Key here of course is an Iraqi government that understands this is the last chance for democratic success, and must have no qualms about disarming the Shiite militias and using the army to quell both Shiite and Sunni terrorists.