The Corner

Two Quick Thoughts on Loper Bright, Chevron, and Recusals

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Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson listens to questions during her confirmation hearing on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., March 22, 2022.

Elizabeth Frantz/Reuters

The Supreme Court this morning agreed to hear Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, a case involving a direct challenge to the Chevron doctrine; the case will be heard next year. The doctrine, which dates to a 1984 decision won by the Environmental Protection Agency, holds that courts should defer to administrative agencies when the agencies interpret the statutes they are charged with enforcing. At the time, this was a conservative cause: When Ronald Reagan came into office and put conservatives in charge of the agencies (including now-justice Neil Gorsuch’s mother, who ran the EPA from 1981 to 1983), liberal judges wanted to lock the administration into liberal policies developed under earlier administrations. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council gave new executive-branch leadership more latitude, but it did so at the expense of the powers both of Congress (which saw more of its authority seized not only by the elected executive but by unelected agency staff) and of the courts (which are supposed to decide how to read statutes). There has been a substantial separation-of-powers critique of Chevron in recent decades; Justice Antonin Scalia, long a defender of Chevron, was rethinking that view in his last years, and Gorsuch has been the loudest critic of the doctrine on the current Court.

Let me offer two quick thoughts.

Dan McLaughlin

About the Author

Dan McLaughlin

Dan McLaughlin is a senior writer at National Review Online and a fellow at National Review Institute.

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