Attrition’s cruel math favors Russia.
There has, I think, been an assumption among some that the war in Ukraine can “safely” be left in a state of stalemate, but that ignores the uncomfortable reality that Ukraine’s position in its east is looking increasingly shaky. Ukraine’s commander in chief, Oleksandr Syrsky, has described how the situation there has “significantly worsened in recent days.”
The Russians have been intensifying their attacks in the Donbas region, part, presumably, of the softening up of Ukrainian defenses ahead of what is expected to be a major offensive within the next few months. It is also taking steps to secure its position in the territories it has occupied, including building a railway line through them. This would be useful in supplying logistical support for any offensive and also offers Russia a link to Crimea that may be more secure (or reparable) than its vulnerable bridge to the peninsula.
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s second-largest city, Kharkiv, which is in the northeast of the country and lies only about 20 miles from the Russian border, has recently come under ferocious air attack. Already vulnerable because of its proximity to Russian territory (a missile from there can reach Kharkiv within a minute), a shortage of air defenses is making a bad situation worse, and the city has suffered severe damage. The best guess is that the Russians are trying to drive as many people as they can out of Kharkiv, perhaps in the hope that, if events go their way in any offensive, they might also be able to seize it, a result that would be an immense strategic and psychological blow to Ukraine.
The war in Ukraine has for some time been a war of attrition. And attrition’s cruel math favors Russia, which has a much larger population and doesn’t worry too much about the lives of its soldiers. What matters to the Kremlin is not how many Russian soldiers live but how many Ukrainian troops die. And while Ukraine’s allies hesitate, Moscow is benefiting considerably from the flow of equipment from allies such as North Korea, Iran, and, of course, China. The idea that helping Ukraine is a distraction from what the U.S. needs to be doing in response to the threat from China doesn’t hold up. To Beijing, Ukraine is another front in its global competition with the U.S. It knows that a Russian victory in that war would bring no respite in Europe but would embolden Putin, its ally, to ramp up the pressure against NATO there.
Reports from Ukraine, meanwhile, are of severe shortages of equipment: Its forces are outgunned and outnumbered. Meanwhile, Russia has taken advantage of weak Ukrainian air defenses to systematically destroy Ukrainian power plants, adding to the practical and psychological pressure on Ukraine and its people.
Wars of attrition can end very quickly (Perhaps the implosion of the Central Powers in 1918 is the best example), and while few are anticipating that Ukraine will collapse this summer, it is not something that can be ruled out. The consequences would be felt far from Eastern Europe. The fiasco in Kabul in 2021, and the message of American weakness that it projected, must have played a part in Putin’s calculations as to whether he could risk launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine less than a year later — and the perception of fading American power wasn’t confined to the Kremlin. Now imagine the impact that the fall of Kyiv would have on our allies, our enemies, and, critically, the undecided wondering which way to jump. As the war in Ukraine or the Houthis’ disruption of supply lanes in the Red Sea remind us, the Pax Americana is already crumbling. For it to take another blow is not something that Americans should want to see.
I don’t know how Russia’s war on Ukraine eventually ends, but to withhold aid to Ukraine now is to risk a catastrophe that could be closer than we like to think.