The International Trade Commission split 3–3 on a complaint by the United Steel Workers about tire imports from China — which means that the U.S. will slap taxes on those imports. Daniel Ikenson explains that U.S. tiremakers don’t want these taxes.

So how does the union expect to benefit from trade remedy measures? By obtaining negotiating leverage over industry management. If AD/CVD measures are imposed, they will remain in place for at least five years, unless the petitioners are willing to allow the measures to be revoked. Either way, as petitioners, the union can make things more or less difficult for any and all of the producers subject to the orders. In other words, finding ways to stay in the relatively good graces of the union may become a crucial component of the tire producers’ global production strategies.
This case is not about a U.S. industry seeking reprieve from unfair foreign practices. It is about organized labor misappropriating the trade laws to extract production and wage concessions from U.S. tire industry management. . . .
This is certainly not the first time the trade laws have been abused like this. More and more frequently, the trade laws are being used by domestic producers to hobble their domestic competition’s supply chains.