John Kerry announced a new concession in nuclear negotiations with Iran today: The Islamic Republic won’t have to make an accounting for its past military-related nuclear research. The Post:

“We’re not fixated on Iran specifically accounting for what they did at one point in time or another. We know what they did,” he said in a video call with reporters at the State Department. Kerry spoke from his Boston home where he has been recovering after breaking his leg in a bike accident in Europe.
“It’s critical to us to know that, going forward, those activities have been stopped and that we can account for that in a legitimate way,” he said. “That clearly is one of the requirements, in our judgment, for what has to be achieved in order to have a legitimate agreement.”

We’re thinking about the future, not obsessing over the past may seem like a nice principle to apply to negotiations, but it’s just not how this works. Weapons inspectors need to know the history of a country’s programs in order to assess the current ones effectively, for one. This is not an issue that can just be harmlessly conceded to make the Iranians feel better about a potential deal.

Proliferation experts gathered by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, as summarized in a piece we ran today, set out the following as a key priority for an effective inspections regime: “A full declaration by Iran of its past and present nuclear work, which would be an essential starting point for monitoring and verification. In an effort to avoid controversy, the declaration could take the form of a consolidation and updating of the various declarations Iran has made since 2003.”

Further:

The panel also stressed the importance of resolving the IAEA’s outstanding questions about Iran’s alleged weaponization activities — what the IAEA calls the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program. The IAEA’s investigation is essential for understanding the country’s past nuclear-weapons-relevant work, and would offer a basis for inspectors to access military sites where such work occurred and to examine relevant documents and personnel.

Here’s how the Wisconsin Project researchers summarize the situation: “On this crucial issue of inspections, U.S. negotiators should not scramble to reach yet another accommodation in order to seal a final agreement.” Unfortunately, it sounds to me like that’s exactly what they’re doing.