The Afghan Trap

On February 8, Mikhail Gorbachev made a dramatic announcement: If the U.S. cut off aid to the Afghan resistance by March 15, Soviet troop withdrawal could begin on May 15 and be completed within ten months. He indicated that this pullout could be “front-end loaded,” as Secretary of State Shultz had proposed, and that it would proceed regardless of whether there was agreement on an interim Afghan government to succeed the Communist regime.

U.S. media immediately concluded that “peace is at hand.” The possibility of “a good settlement” is nearing, claimed the Washington Post the day after Gorbachev’s announcement. Two days later, a New York Times editorial hailed the pledge as “an extraordinary statement” that indicates that, “from all appearances, Moscow has made the painful decision to lose a war.”

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Constantine C. Menges

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On February 8, Mikhail Gorbachev made a dramatic announcement: If the U.S. cut off aid to the Afghan resistance by March 15, Soviet troop withdrawal could begin on May 15 and be completed within ten months. He indicated that this pullout could be “front-end loaded,” as Secretary of State Shultz had proposed, and that it would proceed regardless of whether there was agreement on an interim Afghan government to succeed the Communist regime.

U.S. media immediately concluded that “peace is at hand.” The possibility of “a good settlement” is nearing, claimed the Washington Post the day after Gorbachev’s announcement. Two days later, a New York Times editorial hailed the pledge as “an extraordinary statement” that indicates that, “from all appearances, Moscow has made the painful decision to lose a war.”