Pitfalls of the Practical

The search for a conservative political theory continues apace. In Radicals and Conservatives (Regnery, $4.00), William M. McGovern and. David Collier offer us “at least the beginnings of a coherent philosophy of conservative liberalism [to] strengthen the anti-collectivist movement by serving as its guide.” The implication is that conservatives do not yet have a political philosophy. This is refreshing to hear. The further implication is that conservatives ought to have a political philosophy. And this is even more refreshing to hear.

When, however, the authors offer the political philosophy which they think the conservatives ought to adopt, I have my reservations. The thought of Radicals and Conservatives is too practical, in both the philosophical and common-sense meaning of that term. It is true that the ultimate purpose of political philosophy is to guide political action. But the distinctive features of a given political philosophy are to be found in its definition of the problem of politics; the philosophy will guide action in terms of a particular conception of the problem that is to be solved. McGovern and Collier, it seems to me, have not paid sufficient attention to the definition of the problem; and without such a definition, political action is undirected or—even worse— may derive its direction simply from the political context in which it occurs.

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Stanley Parry

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Edmund Burke

The search for a conservative political theory continues apace. In Radicals and Conservatives (Regnery, $4.00), William M. McGovern and. David Collier offer us “at least the beginnings of a coherent philosophy of conservative liberalism [to] strengthen the anti-collectivist movement by serving as its guide.” The implication is that conservatives do not yet have a political philosophy. This is refreshing to hear. The further implication is that conservatives ought to have a political philosophy. And this is even more refreshing to hear.

When, however, the authors offer the political philosophy which they think the conservatives ought to adopt, I have my reservations. The thought of Radicals and Conservatives is too practical, in both the philosophical and common-sense meaning of that term. It is true that the ultimate purpose of political philosophy is to guide political action. But the distinctive features of a given political philosophy are to be found in its definition of the problem of politics; the philosophy will guide action in terms of a particular conception of the problem that is to be solved. McGovern and Collier, it seems to me, have not paid sufficient attention to the definition of the problem; and without such a definition, political action is undirected or—even worse— may derive its direction simply from the political context in which it occurs.