Helping Gorbachev Make It

The U.S. is clearly taking sides, albeit quietly, in the internal power struggle now going on in the Soviet Union. In the Communist Party Plenum coming up in June, Gorbachev faces tough sledding. Foes of glasnost and perestroika believe he is moving too fast and too far; they intend to slow him down, perhaps permanently. Afghanistan is a case in point. Gorbachev’s apparent willingness to engineer withdrawal on flimsy terms—without a guarantee of a pro-Soviet government in Kabul—alarms Soviet hawks, who see Afghanistan ending ignominiously for the USSR.

The NATO Summit meeting in Brussels this month provided one piece of evidence that the Administration is taking an active interest in Gorbachev’s future. On the surface, President Reagan’s mission in Brussels seemed simple enough. NATO leaders, concerned about the imbalance between Warsaw Pact and NATO conventional forces, especially in the wake of the INF treaty, needed reassurance. Reagan provided it.

JM

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John McLaughlin

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The U.S. is clearly taking sides, albeit quietly, in the internal power struggle now going on in the Soviet Union. In the Communist Party Plenum coming up in June, Gorbachev faces tough sledding. Foes of glasnost and perestroika believe he is moving too fast and too far; they intend to slow him down, perhaps permanently. Afghanistan is a case in point. Gorbachev’s apparent willingness to engineer withdrawal on flimsy terms—without a guarantee of a pro-Soviet government in Kabul—alarms Soviet hawks, who see Afghanistan ending ignominiously for the USSR.

The NATO Summit meeting in Brussels this month provided one piece of evidence that the Administration is taking an active interest in Gorbachev’s future. On the surface, President Reagan’s mission in Brussels seemed simple enough. NATO leaders, concerned about the imbalance between Warsaw Pact and NATO conventional forces, especially in the wake of the INF treaty, needed reassurance. Reagan provided it.