The Perils of Poverty

For the past twenty months the world has been relatively free from the ravages of international terrorism. Some observers have attributed this lull to the American raid on Libya in April 1986, and to increased toughness and cooperation on the part of European governments in response to the rash of bombings in their countries in late 1985 and early 1986. Others suggest that terrorism is historically a cyclical phenomenon and that what we are now witnessing is nothing more than the downswing of the cycle. It will not be long, they caution, before we suffer a new outbreak of terrorist violence.

The real explanation for the present lull in terrorist operations lies elsewhere. A clue can be found in reports last fall that Lebanese Druse leader Walid Jumblatt was sending eight hundred fighting men to Libya to shore up Colonel Qaddafi’s flagging efforts in Chad. By all accounts, Jumblatt is not particularly eager to weaken his militia’s ability to project power in Lebanon, nor does he want to see Druse soldiers die in the wastelands of northern Chad. It is simply a matter of economics. Jumblatt cannot afford any longer to maintain his four to five thousand-man militia. By renting out some of his soldiers, the Lebanese warlord not only is relieved from paying for their care and maintenance, but also receives desperately needed hard currency and military equipment from the Libyans in exchange.

For the past twenty months the world has been relatively free from the ravages of international terrorism. Some observers have attributed this lull to the American raid on Libya in April 1986, and to increased toughness and cooperation on the part of European governments in response to the rash of bombings in their countries in late 1985 and early 1986. Others suggest that terrorism is historically a cyclical phenomenon and that what we are now witnessing is nothing more than the downswing of the cycle. It will not be long, they caution, before we suffer a new outbreak of terrorist violence.

The real explanation for the present lull in terrorist operations lies elsewhere. A clue can be found in reports last fall that Lebanese Druse leader Walid Jumblatt was sending eight hundred fighting men to Libya to shore up Colonel Qaddafi’s flagging efforts in Chad. By all accounts, Jumblatt is not particularly eager to weaken his militia’s ability to project power in Lebanon, nor does he want to see Druse soldiers die in the wastelands of northern Chad. It is simply a matter of economics. Jumblatt cannot afford any longer to maintain his four to five thousand-man militia. By renting out some of his soldiers, the Lebanese warlord not only is relieved from paying for their care and maintenance, but also receives desperately needed hard currency and military equipment from the Libyans in exchange.