National Trends

In the last week’s report on East West trade, this columnist made only passing reference to perhaps the most significant fact disclosed by the McClellan proceedings, namely: that the notions of the Executive branch about what is its business, and nobody else’s, have become for all practical purposes, The Law. Or to put this more concisely: the argument that “separation of powers” permits the Executive branch to treat the administration of government as its private concern is no longer the occasional (and by past consensus, arbitrary) refuge of chief executives for super sing the details of “embarrassing conversations”; it has achieved doctrinal status. So that Congress is now, at the discretion of the Executive, barred from exercising its constitutional prerogative to superintend the execution of its laws.

The running dispute between the McClellan Committee and Administration witnesses as to what information Congress was entitled to, involved two distinct categories of information: 1) “classified” data, the divulgence of which (the Administration said) might impair the efficiency and morale of government employees. In the first category were the various embargo lists and the criteria employed by U.S. officials in determining which items were sufficiently non-strategic to be decontrolled. In the second, the recommendations of JOC, the views of the interested Departments and those of certain officials.

In the last week’s report on East West trade, this columnist made only passing reference to perhaps the most significant fact disclosed by the McClellan proceedings, namely: that the notions of the Executive branch about what is its business, and nobody else’s, have become for all practical purposes, The Law. Or to put this more concisely: the argument that “separation of powers” permits the Executive branch to treat the administration of government as its private concern is no longer the occasional (and by past consensus, arbitrary) refuge of chief executives for super sing the details of “embarrassing conversations”; it has achieved doctrinal status. So that Congress is now, at the discretion of the Executive, barred from exercising its constitutional prerogative to superintend the execution of its laws.

The running dispute between the McClellan Committee and Administration witnesses as to what information Congress was entitled to, involved two distinct categories of information: 1) “classified” data, the divulgence of which (the Administration said) might impair the efficiency and morale of government employees. In the first category were the various embargo lists and the criteria employed by U.S. officials in determining which items were sufficiently non-strategic to be decontrolled. In the second, the recommendations of JOC, the views of the interested Departments and those of certain officials.