Principles and Heresies

Neither the sections on defense in President Nixon’s foreign policy report nor Secretary Laird’s defense posture statement to the Congress develops a program directed toward seriously meeting the degradation of our defenses relative to the strength of the Soviet Union. Rather, the Administration’s analysis of growing Soviet strength confirms the most serious apprehensions, while the proposals for American countermeasures are, so far as current deployment is concerned, too little and, so far as projections are concerned, much too late. On the decisive question of strategic deterrence, Secretary Laird’s projections of Soviet nuclear-missile power do nothing to dispute the analysis of Charles Benson, recently published in national review (March 9); but what is ignored is the significance of the SS-9 buildup as a first-strike force capable within a very few years of eliminating our land-based missile capacity and thus calling our whole deterrent capability into question.

But although there is no direct consideration of this specific danger, there are two specious efforts made to minimize the SS-9 buildup as such. The first is a hope that the temporary halt in such deployment might indicate Soviet acceptance of “sufficiency.” This hope has recently been blown sky high by Senator Henry Jackson, who revealed intelligence information that the buildup had been resumed. The second is a continuing reliance on the SALT talks. To this hope anyone with a knowledge of Soviet diplomatic activity over fifty years can give a categorical answer: The Soviets will sign no treaty of armament limitation that does not strengthen them and weaken us. Where one would have hoped for a sharp increase in our offensive missiles, a much accelerated buildup of the ABM, and crash programs directed toward new weapons systems, we have business as usual in modernizing Minuteman and Poseidon and in the previously projected minor increase in ABM.

FS

About the Author

Frank S. Meyer

Frank S. Meyer was a senior editor of National Review.

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Neither the sections on defense in President Nixon’s foreign policy report nor Secretary Laird’s defense posture statement to the Congress develops a program directed toward seriously meeting the degradation of our defenses relative to the strength of the Soviet Union. Rather, the Administration’s analysis of growing Soviet strength confirms the most serious apprehensions, while the proposals for American countermeasures are, so far as current deployment is concerned, too little and, so far as projections are concerned, much too late. On the decisive question of strategic deterrence, Secretary Laird’s projections of Soviet nuclear-missile power do nothing to dispute the analysis of Charles Benson, recently published in national review (March 9); but what is ignored is the significance of the SS-9 buildup as a first-strike force capable within a very few years of eliminating our land-based missile capacity and thus calling our whole deterrent capability into question.

But although there is no direct consideration of this specific danger, there are two specious efforts made to minimize the SS-9 buildup as such. The first is a hope that the temporary halt in such deployment might indicate Soviet acceptance of “sufficiency.” This hope has recently been blown sky high by Senator Henry Jackson, who revealed intelligence information that the buildup had been resumed. The second is a continuing reliance on the SALT talks. To this hope anyone with a knowledge of Soviet diplomatic activity over fifty years can give a categorical answer: The Soviets will sign no treaty of armament limitation that does not strengthen them and weaken us. Where one would have hoped for a sharp increase in our offensive missiles, a much accelerated buildup of the ABM, and crash programs directed toward new weapons systems, we have business as usual in modernizing Minuteman and Poseidon and in the previously projected minor increase in ABM.