Who Shall Be Master?

According to the accepted interpretation, the Sino-Soviet conflict has centered on an ideological dispute over peaceful coexistence (Khrushchev) vs. revolutionary struggle (Mao). A fortnight ago I showed that, when tested by what has actually been happening in the world, this interpretation is proved to be superficial. The ideological dispute is not correlated with any clearcut differentiation between the policies carried out by Moscow and Peking in practice. In practice, both Moscow and Peking favor “peaceful coexistence” in the sense of avoiding general war; in practice, both favor “revolutionary struggle” in the sense of supporting, wherever feasible, the weakening of Western or Western-oriented regimes and the advance toward Communist power.

Nevertheless, the conflict exists and is being conducted with ferocity by both sides. If the ideological element is secondary and superficial, what is all the noise about? There is no single or simple answer, but there is a solid premise to start from: the conflict—whatever else it may be or may become—is a struggle for control of the international Communist enterprise, of “the Party,” “the movement,” “the apparatus.” When we use this premise as guide, the course of the conflict over these past five or six years—what has not happened as well as what has—becomes intelligible. Two mighty factions of experienced, hardened Communists— one led by the dominant group in the Russian party, the other by the dominant group in the Chinese party— are battling to decide the question that has always been the crux of political struggle: Who shall be master in the house?

JB

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James Burnham

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According to the accepted interpretation, the Sino-Soviet conflict has centered on an ideological dispute over peaceful coexistence (Khrushchev) vs. revolutionary struggle (Mao). A fortnight ago I showed that, when tested by what has actually been happening in the world, this interpretation is proved to be superficial. The ideological dispute is not correlated with any clearcut differentiation between the policies carried out by Moscow and Peking in practice. In practice, both Moscow and Peking favor “peaceful coexistence” in the sense of avoiding general war; in practice, both favor “revolutionary struggle” in the sense of supporting, wherever feasible, the weakening of Western or Western-oriented regimes and the advance toward Communist power.

Nevertheless, the conflict exists and is being conducted with ferocity by both sides. If the ideological element is secondary and superficial, what is all the noise about? There is no single or simple answer, but there is a solid premise to start from: the conflict—whatever else it may be or may become—is a struggle for control of the international Communist enterprise, of “the Party,” “the movement,” “the apparatus.” When we use this premise as guide, the course of the conflict over these past five or six years—what has not happened as well as what has—becomes intelligible. Two mighty factions of experienced, hardened Communists— one led by the dominant group in the Russian party, the other by the dominant group in the Chinese party— are battling to decide the question that has always been the crux of political struggle: Who shall be master in the house?