The Sub Version of Star Wars

Congressional critics frequently lump the SDI (“Star Wars”) and ASAT (anti-satellite weapons) programs together. “Keep the military out of the heavens” is the war cry of those on Capitol Hill who would like to kill two birds with one stone. This has always been nonsense. ASAT and SDI are quite separate programs, conceived years apart from each other, with different purposes. Nevertheless, for reasons never contemplated by the critics, the two programs will soon be vitally interconnected. New tactics and new technology are making ASAT— vigorously attacked by the Soviet Union—crucial to the success of any Star Wars defense.

To understand the connection, we must shift our gaze from the starry skies to the ocean depths. It is the advances now taking place in submarine technology that will make ASATs indispensable in deterring a Soviet first strike. Because of their stealth and mobility, missile-armed nuclear submarines have traditionally been considered the ultimate second-strike weapon. Nuclear submarines have had some limited first-strike capabilities, primarily against land-based bombers and other missile-equipped submarines in port, but heretofore they could not strike with the combination of power and accuracy needed to destroy hardened targets such as fortified command and control centers or missiles protected in underground silos. The Trident I/C-4, in current use, has only a 10 per cent chance of destroying a target hardened to two thousand pounds per square inch. The older Poseidon/C-3 had virtually no chance against hardened targets and was conceived purely as a countervalue weapon against urban/ industrial targets. The Soviet Delta II-class subs use larger warheads with less accuracy, yielding about the same capability as the Trident I/C-4 against hardened targets. Thus traditional strategic doctrine, based on this older technology, made heavy MIRVed ICBMs —the only weapons capable of destroying our ICBMs in their silos—the uniquely necessary tool for a Soviet first strike. Lesser Soviet nuclear weapons might destroy cities and industrial sites, but they could not destroy our missiles. Nuclear destruction would still be mutually assured. To prevent a Soviet first strike, then, we only have to be able to stop their ICBMs. This is the central thesis of SDL New technology is about to change the situation radically. Improvements in both the accuracy and the power of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) will transform submarines into first-strike weapons. The new Trident II/D-5 missiles are so accurate that they have a better than 80 per cent chance of destroying hardened targets. The Trident I/C-4, retrofitted with new technology, will soon have a better than even chance of destroying a hardened silo. Soon missiles in powered flight will be able to use course-correction information from a NAVSTAR satellite, improving accuracy even more, possibly by a factor of four.

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William R. Hawkins

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Congressional critics frequently lump the SDI (“Star Wars”) and ASAT (anti-satellite weapons) programs together. “Keep the military out of the heavens” is the war cry of those on Capitol Hill who would like to kill two birds with one stone. This has always been nonsense. ASAT and SDI are quite separate programs, conceived years apart from each other, with different purposes. Nevertheless, for reasons never contemplated by the critics, the two programs will soon be vitally interconnected. New tactics and new technology are making ASAT— vigorously attacked by the Soviet Union—crucial to the success of any Star Wars defense.

To understand the connection, we must shift our gaze from the starry skies to the ocean depths. It is the advances now taking place in submarine technology that will make ASATs indispensable in deterring a Soviet first strike. Because of their stealth and mobility, missile-armed nuclear submarines have traditionally been considered the ultimate second-strike weapon. Nuclear submarines have had some limited first-strike capabilities, primarily against land-based bombers and other missile-equipped submarines in port, but heretofore they could not strike with the combination of power and accuracy needed to destroy hardened targets such as fortified command and control centers or missiles protected in underground silos. The Trident I/C-4, in current use, has only a 10 per cent chance of destroying a target hardened to two thousand pounds per square inch. The older Poseidon/C-3 had virtually no chance against hardened targets and was conceived purely as a countervalue weapon against urban/ industrial targets. The Soviet Delta II-class subs use larger warheads with less accuracy, yielding about the same capability as the Trident I/C-4 against hardened targets. Thus traditional strategic doctrine, based on this older technology, made heavy MIRVed ICBMs —the only weapons capable of destroying our ICBMs in their silos—the uniquely necessary tool for a Soviet first strike. Lesser Soviet nuclear weapons might destroy cities and industrial sites, but they could not destroy our missiles. Nuclear destruction would still be mutually assured. To prevent a Soviet first strike, then, we only have to be able to stop their ICBMs. This is the central thesis of SDL New technology is about to change the situation radically. Improvements in both the accuracy and the power of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) will transform submarines into first-strike weapons. The new Trident II/D-5 missiles are so accurate that they have a better than 80 per cent chance of destroying hardened targets. The Trident I/C-4, retrofitted with new technology, will soon have a better than even chance of destroying a hardened silo. Soon missiles in powered flight will be able to use course-correction information from a NAVSTAR satellite, improving accuracy even more, possibly by a factor of four.