Arms Control: Three Centuries of Failure

Harvard’s Richard Pipes has observed that “neither détente nor the arms-limitation agreements accompanying it . . . have produced a dent in the upward curve of Soviet defense expenditures.” Instead, Pipes argues, by adopting the public rhetoric of arms control, “the Soviet Union has been able to push through, at relatively small price to its own deployments, severe restrictions on those of the U.S.” Edward N. Luttwak of Georgetown’s Center for Strategic and International Studies has written that “the hope . . . that arms control may in itself bring the strategic competition to an end . . . is supported neither by the pure logic of arms control nor by its experience in practice.” Former ambassador Seymour Weiss has challenged proponents of arms control to show “just what evidence exists that recent nuclear-arms-limitations agreements with the USSR have actually contributed to U.S. security.” Even President Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has argued that arms control is dead.

However clear and commonsensical such evaluations seem, the conventional wisdom still overwhelmingly favors some sort of commitment to arms control or the arms-control “process.” Indeed, many liberals in politics and in the media seem to regard opposition to arms control as irresponsible, extremist, or radical—as a view beyond the pale of rational discussion. Yet empirically, it is advocacy of arms control that must be regarded as the radical position, for it is virtually impossible to find examples of successful arms-control agreements between major powers, not just in the period since World War II, but in any period of history. Those who are suspicious of arms control are the genuine “moderates” in this controversy—the ones whose stand is based on traditional diplomatic practice.

WR

About the Author

William R. Hawkins

Featured Tags

Harvard’s Richard Pipes has observed that “neither détente nor the arms-limitation agreements accompanying it . . . have produced a dent in the upward curve of Soviet defense expenditures.” Instead, Pipes argues, by adopting the public rhetoric of arms control, “the Soviet Union has been able to push through, at relatively small price to its own deployments, severe restrictions on those of the U.S.” Edward N. Luttwak of Georgetown’s Center for Strategic and International Studies has written that “the hope . . . that arms control may in itself bring the strategic competition to an end . . . is supported neither by the pure logic of arms control nor by its experience in practice.” Former ambassador Seymour Weiss has challenged proponents of arms control to show “just what evidence exists that recent nuclear-arms-limitations agreements with the USSR have actually contributed to U.S. security.” Even President Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has argued that arms control is dead.

However clear and commonsensical such evaluations seem, the conventional wisdom still overwhelmingly favors some sort of commitment to arms control or the arms-control “process.” Indeed, many liberals in politics and in the media seem to regard opposition to arms control as irresponsible, extremist, or radical—as a view beyond the pale of rational discussion. Yet empirically, it is advocacy of arms control that must be regarded as the radical position, for it is virtually impossible to find examples of successful arms-control agreements between major powers, not just in the period since World War II, but in any period of history. Those who are suspicious of arms control are the genuine “moderates” in this controversy—the ones whose stand is based on traditional diplomatic practice.