70 Year Magazine Archive

The Third World War

by James Burnham

Softs, Hards and American Strategy

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American thinking on the current international situation, and on the policy and strategy appropriate thereto, divides into two primary tendencies. There is a “hard” tendency that proceeds from the premise that we are at war—though a curious, in some respects unprecedented, kind of war—and that the strategic problem is to win the war. There is a “soft” tendency that proceeds from the contrary premise that we are at peace—though a precarious and troubled peace—and that the strategic problem is to prevent war and preserve that peace.

Nearly everything published on these matters in national review expresses the hard tendency; most that is published in the Nation, the New Republic, the Reporter and Commonweal, expresses the soft. Most, though not all, writers featured in the mass press, especially when they are also big-time names, are Softs: Adlai Stevenson, Paul Hoffman, Chester Bowles, Norman Cousins, Robert Oppenheimer, Field Marshal Montgomery, that sort of thing. Under both Democrats and Republicans, most of the policy-determining seats of government have been occupied by Softs. There have been Hards here and there—in the Atomic Energy Commission, the Pentagon, CIA, and scattered outposts at all echelons—but not enough, or well enough placed, to affect basic policy.

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