The Mob and the Media

The frontal assault upon the biases of the media launched by Vice President Agnew reflects the fact that time has now become the crucial dimension of the Vietnam war. The Nixon strategy rests on the assumption that domestic opinion will permit him to withdraw troops slowly enough to allow the rearming and redeployment of South Vietnamese troops. The view that the ARVN forces, gradually improving, can hold their own rests on another estimate: that Communist losses during the great 1968 large-force engagements were serious enough to be at least temporarily crippling, and that before such units can return to adequate strength the countryside can be largely reoccupied and the guerrillas’ local organization destroyed. By 1971, in the opinion of the British weekly, the Economist, ARVN forces may be able to defend the frontier with the help of U.S. logistics and air power. The outcome in Vietnam therefore depends on which of two things happens first: the destruction of the Communist guerrilla apparatus, or the final withdrawal of American combat troops because of domestic opinion.

Both Agnew’s speech, and the Vietnam Moratorium, are significant events in this dimension of the war. The antiwar demonstrators, pressing the government for a precipitate withdrawal, strengthen the Communist side in the struggle over time. No doubt many of the demonstrators are well-meaning in their antiwar sentiments; but, for those who are in fact well-meaning, participation is most accurately described by the famous epigram: It was worse than a crime; it was a blunder.

Featured Tags

The frontal assault upon the biases of the media launched by Vice President Agnew reflects the fact that time has now become the crucial dimension of the Vietnam war. The Nixon strategy rests on the assumption that domestic opinion will permit him to withdraw troops slowly enough to allow the rearming and redeployment of South Vietnamese troops. The view that the ARVN forces, gradually improving, can hold their own rests on another estimate: that Communist losses during the great 1968 large-force engagements were serious enough to be at least temporarily crippling, and that before such units can return to adequate strength the countryside can be largely reoccupied and the guerrillas’ local organization destroyed. By 1971, in the opinion of the British weekly, the Economist, ARVN forces may be able to defend the frontier with the help of U.S. logistics and air power. The outcome in Vietnam therefore depends on which of two things happens first: the destruction of the Communist guerrilla apparatus, or the final withdrawal of American combat troops because of domestic opinion.

Both Agnew’s speech, and the Vietnam Moratorium, are significant events in this dimension of the war. The antiwar demonstrators, pressing the government for a precipitate withdrawal, strengthen the Communist side in the struggle over time. No doubt many of the demonstrators are well-meaning in their antiwar sentiments; but, for those who are in fact well-meaning, participation is most accurately described by the famous epigram: It was worse than a crime; it was a blunder.