The Third World War

During the past several months, as the November 17 date approached for opening the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), most of the influential newspapers, columnists, TV commentators and liberal political leaders in the United States called for various American concessions as the proper method for achieving real progress in disarmament. Hubert Humphrey, along with a large bloc of senators for whom Edward Brooke of Massachusetts and Edmund Muskie of Maine have been prominent spokesmen, called on the President to order a unilateral suspension of U.S. testing of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV) “as a gesture of goodwill before the start of the arms talks” (H. Humphrey, Tokyo, Oct. 27). Many editorials suggested also a halt in development of the anti-missile system voted by Congress last spring. In the same pre-SALT period, the liberals in Congress, fighting persistently to reduce appropriations for strategic armament all down the line, succeeded in cutting many elements well below Pentagon estimates of what the nation’s security requires and in eliminating funds for research and development on a number of advanced weapons. The President was scolded for past intransigence on disarmament and urged to soften up his position so that the Kremlin can be assured of his friendly intentions. Vice President Agnew was given a thousand lashes of the editorial whip for his “intemperate charge that those who favor a MIRV moratorium are playing Russian roulette with United States security” (New York Times, Oct. 27). No prominent person in the United States mentioned publicly that a few concessions, suspensions and moratoriums from the Soviet side might improve the atmosphere for arms talks.

In this same period the Soviet press and Soviet commentators also had a good deal to say about SALT. In fact, the comment in the Soviet media was just about identical to that in the U.S. media: suspicions of Mr. Nixon’s credibility and sincerity, demands for the halting of U.S. ABM and MIRV development, curbing of the U.S. military-industrial complex, denunciation of any U.S. pretension to “a position of strength,” and so on.

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James Burnham

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During the past several months, as the November 17 date approached for opening the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), most of the influential newspapers, columnists, TV commentators and liberal political leaders in the United States called for various American concessions as the proper method for achieving real progress in disarmament. Hubert Humphrey, along with a large bloc of senators for whom Edward Brooke of Massachusetts and Edmund Muskie of Maine have been prominent spokesmen, called on the President to order a unilateral suspension of U.S. testing of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV) “as a gesture of goodwill before the start of the arms talks” (H. Humphrey, Tokyo, Oct. 27). Many editorials suggested also a halt in development of the anti-missile system voted by Congress last spring. In the same pre-SALT period, the liberals in Congress, fighting persistently to reduce appropriations for strategic armament all down the line, succeeded in cutting many elements well below Pentagon estimates of what the nation’s security requires and in eliminating funds for research and development on a number of advanced weapons. The President was scolded for past intransigence on disarmament and urged to soften up his position so that the Kremlin can be assured of his friendly intentions. Vice President Agnew was given a thousand lashes of the editorial whip for his “intemperate charge that those who favor a MIRV moratorium are playing Russian roulette with United States security” (New York Times, Oct. 27). No prominent person in the United States mentioned publicly that a few concessions, suspensions and moratoriums from the Soviet side might improve the atmosphere for arms talks.

In this same period the Soviet press and Soviet commentators also had a good deal to say about SALT. In fact, the comment in the Soviet media was just about identical to that in the U.S. media: suspicions of Mr. Nixon’s credibility and sincerity, demands for the halting of U.S. ABM and MIRV development, curbing of the U.S. military-industrial complex, denunciation of any U.S. pretension to “a position of strength,” and so on.