Wisdom and Conceit Days and Works

Take the case of the separation of state and church in this country. The Constitution has encompassed the principle in this brief formula: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .” The rule has been well known to Americans for the better part of two centuries. They did not find it incompatible with the established churches that existed in several states even after the ratification of the Constitution. They never read it as a declaration of war on the belief in an Almighty God which the vast majority of Americans professed in 1790 and through most of the two centuries thereafter. Nobody saw anything unconstitutional in the exemption of churches from taxes, prayers in Congress and in public schools, chaplains in the armed forces, oaths of office on the Bible, the persistent invocation of divine help and guidance by our political leaders. On the contrary: while insisting that no single church be established by authority of federal law, Americans of many generations have agreed that disestablished worship of God be continued, encouraged, supported, and held precious in this country. A separation of state and church could be cast in a variety of molds: a political regime hostile to religion, as in the Soviet Union; a public authority committed to indifference regarding religion, as in France; or a government secular yet solicitous of divine worship among and by the people. Ours has been the latter.

Is a constitution nothing but words? True, the letter of a written constitution must never be disregarded, but it does require interpretation. At that point, does not the flow of precedent, the character of an agreement continuously ratified, count for something? Yet, the Supreme Court began, in mid-twentieth century, to read the First Amendment as if it had been written yesterday, or needed to be restored from oblivion. Not only in this matter but also with regard to freedom of speech and other civil rights, the Court during the last twenty years has treated each case as if it stood by itself, pursuing its inherent logic without regard to other desiderata, pushing its findings to abstract consummations. The historical dimension and the spiritual dimension were left aside while constitutional langauge was driven to a lone conclusion.

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Gerhart Niemeyer

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Take the case of the separation of state and church in this country. The Constitution has encompassed the principle in this brief formula: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .” The rule has been well known to Americans for the better part of two centuries. They did not find it incompatible with the established churches that existed in several states even after the ratification of the Constitution. They never read it as a declaration of war on the belief in an Almighty God which the vast majority of Americans professed in 1790 and through most of the two centuries thereafter. Nobody saw anything unconstitutional in the exemption of churches from taxes, prayers in Congress and in public schools, chaplains in the armed forces, oaths of office on the Bible, the persistent invocation of divine help and guidance by our political leaders. On the contrary: while insisting that no single church be established by authority of federal law, Americans of many generations have agreed that disestablished worship of God be continued, encouraged, supported, and held precious in this country. A separation of state and church could be cast in a variety of molds: a political regime hostile to religion, as in the Soviet Union; a public authority committed to indifference regarding religion, as in France; or a government secular yet solicitous of divine worship among and by the people. Ours has been the latter.

Is a constitution nothing but words? True, the letter of a written constitution must never be disregarded, but it does require interpretation. At that point, does not the flow of precedent, the character of an agreement continuously ratified, count for something? Yet, the Supreme Court began, in mid-twentieth century, to read the First Amendment as if it had been written yesterday, or needed to be restored from oblivion. Not only in this matter but also with regard to freedom of speech and other civil rights, the Court during the last twenty years has treated each case as if it stood by itself, pursuing its inherent logic without regard to other desiderata, pushing its findings to abstract consummations. The historical dimension and the spiritual dimension were left aside while constitutional langauge was driven to a lone conclusion.