Mr. Carter’s Information Gap

In February 1978, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown released the first Carter Administration posture statement on defense programs (Annual Defense Report for FY 1979). In general, the Brown statement is a sort of modified throwback to 1960s strategic thinking; but it has one particularly disturbing aspect: it is reasonably clear that the statement represents an attempt by the Carter Administration to obtain congressional ratification of a SALT II agreement by denying the general public information concerning Soviet strategic programs.

Secretary Brown’s 1978 report informs us that as of January 1, 1978 the Soviets had 1,400+ ICBMs and 900+ SLBMs. This style of approximate figures represents a rather dramatic departure. For many years the Department of Defense has annually released the exact number of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs. Why the sudden change? Could it be that the total number of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs was above the SALT I limit?

JG

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Jake Garn

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In February 1978, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown released the first Carter Administration posture statement on defense programs (Annual Defense Report for FY 1979). In general, the Brown statement is a sort of modified throwback to 1960s strategic thinking; but it has one particularly disturbing aspect: it is reasonably clear that the statement represents an attempt by the Carter Administration to obtain congressional ratification of a SALT II agreement by denying the general public information concerning Soviet strategic programs.

Secretary Brown’s 1978 report informs us that as of January 1, 1978 the Soviets had 1,400+ ICBMs and 900+ SLBMs. This style of approximate figures represents a rather dramatic departure. For many years the Department of Defense has annually released the exact number of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs. Why the sudden change? Could it be that the total number of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs was above the SALT I limit?