On the Right

New York, Dec. 4—Sad to say, the Soviet Union is superbly situated even after Mr. Reagan’s speech. Reagan proposes, after all, nothing very different from what the Soviet Union has known all along it can get, namely the cancellation of our inchoate program in return for the abandonment of their established program. An analysis in purely economic terms, and no doubt these are among those being pressed within the Kremlin by the hawks, is to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. If today they were to agree to Mr. Reagan’s proposals, they would need to pull back, and dismantle, five-hundred-odd missiles. We, by contrast, could stop producing ours, and forgo the expense of their installation. Quite apart from the notorious reluctance of the Soviet Union to move back from any forward position it has achieved, there is little to lose from simply—waiting.

For what? Well, for one thing the Soviet Union is by no means reluctant for the United States to spend $20 to $30 billion that might conceivably prove an unnecessary expense. But what they have primarily to gain, of course, is a test .of the ultimate power of the European countries’ peace movement, concerning which designation more immediately. (See also “The Protracted Conflict.”)

About the Author

William F. Buckley Jr.

William F. Buckley Jr. founded National Review magazine in 1955.

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New York, Dec. 4—Sad to say, the Soviet Union is superbly situated even after Mr. Reagan’s speech. Reagan proposes, after all, nothing very different from what the Soviet Union has known all along it can get, namely the cancellation of our inchoate program in return for the abandonment of their established program. An analysis in purely economic terms, and no doubt these are among those being pressed within the Kremlin by the hawks, is to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. If today they were to agree to Mr. Reagan’s proposals, they would need to pull back, and dismantle, five-hundred-odd missiles. We, by contrast, could stop producing ours, and forgo the expense of their installation. Quite apart from the notorious reluctance of the Soviet Union to move back from any forward position it has achieved, there is little to lose from simply—waiting.

For what? Well, for one thing the Soviet Union is by no means reluctant for the United States to spend $20 to $30 billion that might conceivably prove an unnecessary expense. But what they have primarily to gain, of course, is a test .of the ultimate power of the European countries’ peace movement, concerning which designation more immediately. (See also “The Protracted Conflict.”)