budsman or try to pare down his powers. Partly as a result of pressure from civil servants, the Ombudsmen recently appointed by Denmark, Norway and New Zealand are much weaker than the centuries-old Swedish model. Nevertheless, the reduction of administrative arbitrariness is merely a mediate objective, not a final goal. Surely the arbitrary way that many of our government policies are applied is harmful, but the policies themselves are frequently more so. There are even situations where an Ombudsman by insisting on strict adherence to the spirit of the law may make the situation worse (Cf. p. 90). Still, if we are presently unable to fire civil servants, putting restrictions, even comparatively weak restrictions, on their ability to behave arbitrarily is surely desirable.
The real problem we face is the overexpansion of governmental powers. The fact that lower-level officials sometimes use these powers in ways that their superiors would not approve is a much less important defect in our present system. The Ombudsman can deal only with this comparatively minor problem. This is not, of course, an argument against the institution of the Ombudsman, only against undue enthusiasm.




Comments