Understanding Pakistan

THERE are no simple answers to the dilemmas presented by Pakistan and its president. Of course, Pervez Musharraf’s state of emergency is nothing like the terrifying authoritarian scourge painted by some of the Western media. If it were, he would not have allowed the English-language press to continue publishing, or Benazir Bhutto to make speeches to admiring Western media folk. (As one experienced aid-agency worker e-mailed me, “It’s not like in the days of Zia, when journalists shook in their shoes.”) Nor would Benazir have initially refrained from calling out her political party-an organization accustomed to political violence-onto the streets. There is little sign of genuine popular anger in Pakistan, because the state of emergency barely touches the lives of ordinary people.

On the other hand, Musharraf’s roundups and media shutdowns clearly have much more to do with the preservation of his power and political viability than with Pakistan’s battles against Islamist terrorism and tribal insurgency. Though one influential Islamist general has been arrested, Musharraf has so far demonstrated no greater willingness or ability to suppress Islamist parties, rescue educational and religious institutions from the extremists’ grip, or crush tribal uprisings on the frontier. The targets of the emergency are instead the people who would be the kernel of civil society in Pakistan if it were a better functioning society.

JF

About the Author

Jonathan Foreman

Mr. Foreman, a writer at large for Standpoint magazine, is based in London and New Delhi.

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THERE are no simple answers to the dilemmas presented by Pakistan and its president. Of course, Pervez Musharraf’s state of emergency is nothing like the terrifying authoritarian scourge painted by some of the Western media. If it were, he would not have allowed the English-language press to continue publishing, or Benazir Bhutto to make speeches to admiring Western media folk. (As one experienced aid-agency worker e-mailed me, “It’s not like in the days of Zia, when journalists shook in their shoes.”) Nor would Benazir have initially refrained from calling out her political party-an organization accustomed to political violence-onto the streets. There is little sign of genuine popular anger in Pakistan, because the state of emergency barely touches the lives of ordinary people.

On the other hand, Musharraf’s roundups and media shutdowns clearly have much more to do with the preservation of his power and political viability than with Pakistan’s battles against Islamist terrorism and tribal insurgency. Though one influential Islamist general has been arrested, Musharraf has so far demonstrated no greater willingness or ability to suppress Islamist parties, rescue educational and religious institutions from the extremists’ grip, or crush tribal uprisings on the frontier. The targets of the emergency are instead the people who would be the kernel of civil society in Pakistan if it were a better functioning society.