Really Big Oil

BACK in 1973, Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the petroleum minister of Saudi Arabia, feared that while he was wielding his “oil weapon,” the West might wield weapons of its own. Rumors circulated that Washington was considering seizing the Saudi oilfields by force. According to Anthony Cave Brown’s Oil, God, and Gold, Yamani “worried that anyone could even suggest it. All the more so because desperate people sometimes do desperate things.” Defense secretary James Schlesinger later said, “I was prepared to seize Abu Dhabi. Something small. But nothing big. Militarily we could have seized one of the Arab states. I think the Arabs were quite worried about it after 1973.”

Of course, the idea, unlikely to begin with, quickly faded as the West and the Gulf states settled into an accommodation. But the whispered political fantasy from 1973 is experiencing a comeback. There are two principal sources of power for Middle Eastern states and terrorist groups hostile to the West: weapons of mass destruction (see my “Delay or Die?” NR, Dec. 3) and oil. The administration, by giving Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to allow inspectors back into the country, is taking the first step to deal with the weapons threat seriously. But the war on terrorism should also seek at least to diminish the influence of—and perhaps to destroy—OPEC.

About the Author

Rich Lowry

Rich Lowry is the editor in chief of National Review.

Featured Tags

World Trade Organization

BACK in 1973, Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the petroleum minister of Saudi Arabia, feared that while he was wielding his “oil weapon,” the West might wield weapons of its own. Rumors circulated that Washington was considering seizing the Saudi oilfields by force. According to Anthony Cave Brown’s Oil, God, and Gold, Yamani “worried that anyone could even suggest it. All the more so because desperate people sometimes do desperate things.” Defense secretary James Schlesinger later said, “I was prepared to seize Abu Dhabi. Something small. But nothing big. Militarily we could have seized one of the Arab states. I think the Arabs were quite worried about it after 1973.”

Of course, the idea, unlikely to begin with, quickly faded as the West and the Gulf states settled into an accommodation. But the whispered political fantasy from 1973 is experiencing a comeback. There are two principal sources of power for Middle Eastern states and terrorist groups hostile to the West: weapons of mass destruction (see my “Delay or Die?” NR, Dec. 3) and oil. The administration, by giving Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to allow inspectors back into the country, is taking the first step to deal with the weapons threat seriously. But the war on terrorism should also seek at least to diminish the influence of—and perhaps to destroy—OPEC.