Books in Brief: Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight

Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight, edited by Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass (Ballinger, 392 pp., $34.95)

As a result of the INF treaty, arms control has gained new respectability, as well as momentum. The question remains, however, whether arms control has any real utility, and that is the subject of this volume. Carnesale and Haass, in concert with nine other Harvard specialists, present 12 essays intended to cut through the claims of both hawks and doves and to examine objectively the results of a quartercentury of arms-control negotiations. Seven of these essays are case studies of specific negotiations: test bans, accident prevention, non-proliferation, SALT I and II, ABM and anti-satellite systems, and biological weapons. Three deal with elements common to all arms talks: verification, linkage, and the issue of whether agreements have a lulling effect on U.S. defense policy. An introductory chapter establishes the format for the succeeding essays, and the editors summarize the findings in a concise and useful final chapter. No camp will be wholly pleased by the conclusions reached, though on balance the advocates of arms control fare the worst. Arms-control talks have not slowed the arms race nor have they improved U.S.-Soviet relations, as liberal and antiwar activists had hoped. Nor have arms talks slowed the Soviet drive for military advantage, as Nixon and Kissinger expected at the time of SALT I. Though talks have been delayed or disrupted by events such as the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the normal pattern has been for talks to proceed without linkage to other fronts in the East-West struggle. Thus agreements have been made against the backdrop of fighting in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Central America, and elsewhere. The editors also find no evidence to support the idea that unilateral American restraint will be copied by the USSR. American restraint on ICBM numbers and the deployment of first-strike weapons, the dismantling of our ABM system, and politically mandated delays in the B-1 and AS AT programs have all been ignored as the Soviets pursue their own objectives. The Soviets do not build “bargaining chips,” they build weapons systems.

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William R. Hawkins

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Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight, edited by Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass (Ballinger, 392 pp., $34.95)

As a result of the INF treaty, arms control has gained new respectability, as well as momentum. The question remains, however, whether arms control has any real utility, and that is the subject of this volume. Carnesale and Haass, in concert with nine other Harvard specialists, present 12 essays intended to cut through the claims of both hawks and doves and to examine objectively the results of a quartercentury of arms-control negotiations. Seven of these essays are case studies of specific negotiations: test bans, accident prevention, non-proliferation, SALT I and II, ABM and anti-satellite systems, and biological weapons. Three deal with elements common to all arms talks: verification, linkage, and the issue of whether agreements have a lulling effect on U.S. defense policy. An introductory chapter establishes the format for the succeeding essays, and the editors summarize the findings in a concise and useful final chapter. No camp will be wholly pleased by the conclusions reached, though on balance the advocates of arms control fare the worst. Arms-control talks have not slowed the arms race nor have they improved U.S.-Soviet relations, as liberal and antiwar activists had hoped. Nor have arms talks slowed the Soviet drive for military advantage, as Nixon and Kissinger expected at the time of SALT I. Though talks have been delayed or disrupted by events such as the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the normal pattern has been for talks to proceed without linkage to other fronts in the East-West struggle. Thus agreements have been made against the backdrop of fighting in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Central America, and elsewhere. The editors also find no evidence to support the idea that unilateral American restraint will be copied by the USSR. American restraint on ICBM numbers and the deployment of first-strike weapons, the dismantling of our ABM system, and politically mandated delays in the B-1 and AS AT programs have all been ignored as the Soviets pursue their own objectives. The Soviets do not build “bargaining chips,” they build weapons systems.