After the Dust Settles

WE ARE so used to thinking that Iraq must lose this war that we may forget that for Saddam, even a tactical loss could be a strategic win. If he should inflict heavy casualties on the United States (say, ten thousand or so) he might even offer to leave Kuwait unconditionally. Such a seeming defeat would, in fact, be victory. His stature in the Arab world would be enhanced enormously, for even Gamal Abdul Nasser never succeeded in fighting the West as an equal. The Arab world, so the Iraqi dictator believes, would be consumed with anti-Western rage, and ultimately the United States would be forced to make a deal that would leave him pre-eminent in the region. If even part of Saddam’s dark fantasy comes true, the Middle East will be a turbulent and wretched part of the world for years to come.

The kind of settlement that will emerge from a Persian Gulf war depends on how that war is fought, what price it exacts from the combatants, and what kinds of ripple effects are felt in the Arab world. But it is none too soon to begin thinking about what the postwar world may look like, or rather how we should shape it to our purposes. In so doing we should remember that our victory must be defined not only in terms of battlefield success, but in terms of politics. Harry Summers tells the story of an American Army colonel talking with his North Vietnamese counterpart as the United States was withdrawing from Indochina. “You never beat us in a single battle,” the American said. The Vietnamese reflected for a moment and said, “That is true, but irrelevant.” It is entirely possible today, as it was in Vietnam, for the United States to win a pyrrhic victory. To avoid this, Saddam must be defeated not only thoroughly but relatively cheaply. No one in the Arab world should be allowed to delude himself that Saddam has managed to trade blows on an equal basis with the United States.

EC

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Eliot A. Cohen

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WE ARE so used to thinking that Iraq must lose this war that we may forget that for Saddam, even a tactical loss could be a strategic win. If he should inflict heavy casualties on the United States (say, ten thousand or so) he might even offer to leave Kuwait unconditionally. Such a seeming defeat would, in fact, be victory. His stature in the Arab world would be enhanced enormously, for even Gamal Abdul Nasser never succeeded in fighting the West as an equal. The Arab world, so the Iraqi dictator believes, would be consumed with anti-Western rage, and ultimately the United States would be forced to make a deal that would leave him pre-eminent in the region. If even part of Saddam’s dark fantasy comes true, the Middle East will be a turbulent and wretched part of the world for years to come.

The kind of settlement that will emerge from a Persian Gulf war depends on how that war is fought, what price it exacts from the combatants, and what kinds of ripple effects are felt in the Arab world. But it is none too soon to begin thinking about what the postwar world may look like, or rather how we should shape it to our purposes. In so doing we should remember that our victory must be defined not only in terms of battlefield success, but in terms of politics. Harry Summers tells the story of an American Army colonel talking with his North Vietnamese counterpart as the United States was withdrawing from Indochina. “You never beat us in a single battle,” the American said. The Vietnamese reflected for a moment and said, “That is true, but irrelevant.” It is entirely possible today, as it was in Vietnam, for the United States to win a pyrrhic victory. To avoid this, Saddam must be defeated not only thoroughly but relatively cheaply. No one in the Arab world should be allowed to delude himself that Saddam has managed to trade blows on an equal basis with the United States.