vision of a larger moral good. Deficient in itself as a path to human fulfillment, such behavior would moreover lead to general chaos, which is why the secularist will insist on the proviso that the satisfaction of one’s desires not violate the rights of others. But, George asks,
Why should anyone respect the rights of others? Merely prudential answers—such as, people should respect the rights of others so that others will respect their rights, or people should respect the rights of others to avoid being punished— simply won’t do. The fact is that people can often get away with violating others’ rights. And they know it. And many do it. If people shouldn’t violate the rights of others, it must be because doing so is morally wrong, but on the secularist account—why is it morally wrong? What is the source of its moral wrongness? . . . No satisfactory answer is forthcoming. None, I submit, is possible.




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