Reconstruction: Unhealed Wound

Reconstruction was a far greater failure than the Civil War itself. In suggesting that the Civil War was a failure I mean that, if one concedes that it had to come out as it did, there was no sense in its lasting so long. Considering the great disparity of resources between North and South, one may well ask why it was not ended like, say, Prussia’s war against France—two or three well-executed decisive battles, and the military phase was essentially over. Instead, it turned into a struggle of some twenty major battles and a final war of attrition in the Eastern theater. The Lincoln Administration, though determined on its course, was ignorant of war.

But if the government during this period made, in this sense, a failure, the congressional leadership which assumed power in the ensuing period (and which fought and vilified Andrew Johnson at every step) made a fiasco. Lincoln had discussed the issue of union and secession in terms that were almost metaphysical. If the Union was indivisible, it followed that the states were never out of the Union, even during the war; there was then, in essence, no problem of “readmitting” them, even though certain practical circumstances had to be taken into account. However abstruse such reasoning may seem, it did provide a basis, in terms that were comprehensible, for continuing the Union.

RW

About the Author

Richard M. Weaver

Featured Tags

Reconstruction was a far greater failure than the Civil War itself. In suggesting that the Civil War was a failure I mean that, if one concedes that it had to come out as it did, there was no sense in its lasting so long. Considering the great disparity of resources between North and South, one may well ask why it was not ended like, say, Prussia’s war against France—two or three well-executed decisive battles, and the military phase was essentially over. Instead, it turned into a struggle of some twenty major battles and a final war of attrition in the Eastern theater. The Lincoln Administration, though determined on its course, was ignorant of war.

But if the government during this period made, in this sense, a failure, the congressional leadership which assumed power in the ensuing period (and which fought and vilified Andrew Johnson at every step) made a fiasco. Lincoln had discussed the issue of union and secession in terms that were almost metaphysical. If the Union was indivisible, it followed that the states were never out of the Union, even during the war; there was then, in essence, no problem of “readmitting” them, even though certain practical circumstances had to be taken into account. However abstruse such reasoning may seem, it did provide a basis, in terms that were comprehensible, for continuing the Union.