On the Right

New York, Jan. 14—Running your finger over the profile of the recent literature dealing with nuclear defense, you bump into a number of interesting dilemmas and anomalies, worth the effort to prescind, and contemplate.

Consider, for instance, the matter of civil defense. We all know that during the 1960s, the evolution of nuclear strategy took a turn which many now have reason to regret. The idea was to ensure that, in the event the Soviet Union launched a nuclear attack against us, it should, so to speak, die with us. A mutual, if involuntary, suicide pact. It was called M(utual) A(ssured) D(estruction). An effort to climb out of the embrace of that doctrine was made by President Nixon when he proposed an anti-ballistic missile. But this carried so marginally (by one vote in the Senate) that it was abandoned on the bargaining table of SALT I. There we agreed to limit to two, the areas we were prepared to defend by anti-ballistic weaponry. This we later reduced to one. The Soviet Union proceeded to defend Moscow. We never got around to defending Washington.

About the Author

William F. Buckley Jr.

William F. Buckley Jr. founded National Review magazine in 1955.

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New York, Jan. 14—Running your finger over the profile of the recent literature dealing with nuclear defense, you bump into a number of interesting dilemmas and anomalies, worth the effort to prescind, and contemplate.

Consider, for instance, the matter of civil defense. We all know that during the 1960s, the evolution of nuclear strategy took a turn which many now have reason to regret. The idea was to ensure that, in the event the Soviet Union launched a nuclear attack against us, it should, so to speak, die with us. A mutual, if involuntary, suicide pact. It was called M(utual) A(ssured) D(estruction). An effort to climb out of the embrace of that doctrine was made by President Nixon when he proposed an anti-ballistic missile. But this carried so marginally (by one vote in the Senate) that it was abandoned on the bargaining table of SALT I. There we agreed to limit to two, the areas we were prepared to defend by anti-ballistic weaponry. This we later reduced to one. The Soviet Union proceeded to defend Moscow. We never got around to defending Washington.