How “Special”? For How Long?

IN the final reviews of his presidency, Bill Clinton’s legacy is generally depicted as modest: stylish but slightly disappointing, something on the lines of a Louis Vuitton handbag contain- ing a very small check. If you are the president-elect, however, it must look quite different: a large steamer trunk bursting with problems, situations, and contingency plans for all-too-likely crises. And at the very top of the heap is a particularly unpleasant surprise: The British are going.

American policymakers have become accustomed, especially since the advent of Mrs. Thatcher in 1979, to thinking of the U.K. as America’s most reliable ally. Whether it was joining in the sanctions and bombing campaign against Iraq or offering early support for the stationing of cruise missiles in Europe, the British were generally helpful to the U.S. In addition, it was the view of both General de Gaulle and the U.S. State Depart- ment that Britain was America’s Trojan Horse inside Europe, preventing the French from turning the European Union into an anti-American superpower. (The State Department approved; the General did not.)

About the Author

John O’Sullivan

John O’Sullivan is a senior fellow at National Review Institute and a contributing editor of National Review.

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IN the final reviews of his presidency, Bill Clinton’s legacy is generally depicted as modest: stylish but slightly disappointing, something on the lines of a Louis Vuitton handbag contain- ing a very small check. If you are the president-elect, however, it must look quite different: a large steamer trunk bursting with problems, situations, and contingency plans for all-too-likely crises. And at the very top of the heap is a particularly unpleasant surprise: The British are going.

American policymakers have become accustomed, especially since the advent of Mrs. Thatcher in 1979, to thinking of the U.K. as America’s most reliable ally. Whether it was joining in the sanctions and bombing campaign against Iraq or offering early support for the stationing of cruise missiles in Europe, the British were generally helpful to the U.S. In addition, it was the view of both General de Gaulle and the U.S. State Depart- ment that Britain was America’s Trojan Horse inside Europe, preventing the French from turning the European Union into an anti-American superpower. (The State Department approved; the General did not.)