After the Euphoria

Summits always generate euphoria: the smiles, the handshakes, the official optimism. So, after Reagan-Gorbachev III, let us try to look beyond, to some persistent realities.

The amazing acceleration of the arms-control process during the past year is entirely in line with what I have called “the Ogarkov factor” (NR, June 5, 1987): the view, correctly attributed to Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, that the Soviet Union could no longer assume victory in a nuclear exchange, that the presence of the Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in Europe posed a real threat to Soviet territory, and that therefore, at almost any cost, the Soviets should negotiate them away.

BC

About the Author

Brian Crozier

Featured Tags

Summits always generate euphoria: the smiles, the handshakes, the official optimism. So, after Reagan-Gorbachev III, let us try to look beyond, to some persistent realities.

The amazing acceleration of the arms-control process during the past year is entirely in line with what I have called “the Ogarkov factor” (NR, June 5, 1987): the view, correctly attributed to Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, that the Soviet Union could no longer assume victory in a nuclear exchange, that the presence of the Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in Europe posed a real threat to Soviet territory, and that therefore, at almost any cost, the Soviets should negotiate them away.