What I’d Do in the Philippines

For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the United States finds itself facing a credible naval challenge in East Asia. Soviet maritime forces now have access to four naval bases in Vietnam and Kampuchea. Soviet submarines, missile-capable battle cruisers, and light aircraft carriers have used these port facilities, and twenty to thirty Soviet naval combat and support vessels regularly use Camranh Bay. These maritime forces are supported by seven major airfields in Laos and Vietnam. Soviet aircraft make reconnaissance sweeps over the South China Sea as far east as Philippine airspace. At the same time, growing Soviet contacts with Kiribati, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea—and the recent events in Fiji—all suggest that the strategic balance in the South Pacific is under considerable pressure.

To offset this Soviet presence and maintain a deterrent balance in the region, the United States must have access to local onshore support facilities. For that purpose, the Philippine bases have always been critical. If the United States lost access to the facilities in the Philippines, it would have to move its forces to the east and north. Tinian, Palau, and Saipan have been suggested; however, not only would they be some considerable distance from the critical ship passages of the South China Sea, but facilities would still have to be constructed. Labor and supplies would have to be imported at very high cost, and construction of adequate facilities would probably take about a decade—and even then the facilities would not compare with those already available at Subic and Clark in the Philippines. In short, too little, too late.

FM

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Ferdinand E. Marcos

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For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the United States finds itself facing a credible naval challenge in East Asia. Soviet maritime forces now have access to four naval bases in Vietnam and Kampuchea. Soviet submarines, missile-capable battle cruisers, and light aircraft carriers have used these port facilities, and twenty to thirty Soviet naval combat and support vessels regularly use Camranh Bay. These maritime forces are supported by seven major airfields in Laos and Vietnam. Soviet aircraft make reconnaissance sweeps over the South China Sea as far east as Philippine airspace. At the same time, growing Soviet contacts with Kiribati, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea—and the recent events in Fiji—all suggest that the strategic balance in the South Pacific is under considerable pressure.

To offset this Soviet presence and maintain a deterrent balance in the region, the United States must have access to local onshore support facilities. For that purpose, the Philippine bases have always been critical. If the United States lost access to the facilities in the Philippines, it would have to move its forces to the east and north. Tinian, Palau, and Saipan have been suggested; however, not only would they be some considerable distance from the critical ship passages of the South China Sea, but facilities would still have to be constructed. Labor and supplies would have to be imported at very high cost, and construction of adequate facilities would probably take about a decade—and even then the facilities would not compare with those already available at Subic and Clark in the Philippines. In short, too little, too late.