70 Year Magazine Archive

Our Ally, Our Problem

by Marin J. Strmecki

Pakistan is an exceptionally hard case—here’s what to do

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AS the Bush administration moves into the next phases of the war against terrorism, it will need to confront a profoundly difficult problem: Pakistan is at the same time an indispensable partner in that war and a principal and continuing source of the terrorist threat. The al-Qaeda network, created in Pakistan in 1989, was nurtured by Islamists in the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) and the military. Ultimate victory in the current conflict will require a concerted strategy to purge the Pakistani government of the elements that facilitated the rise of al-Qaeda.

The genesis of Pakistan’s role in the jihadist terror network was President Zia ul-Haq’s shift toward Islamist ideology in the 1980s. Interpreted in the West merely as an attempt to legitimize his military rule, Zia’s adoption of Islamist views was in fact part of a wider political and geostrategic vision: He sought to use radical Islam to conquer Afghanistan through proxy forces and to create an alliance with states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. The objective was to create an Islamist coalition—one that combined Pakistani nuclear weapons and the oil wealth of the Persian Gulf—that would serve as a “dagger” aimed at India and that would expand its influence into Central Asia.

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