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THE ending of the Cold War was one of history’s great surprises. Involuntarily, as though in some sort of trance, the Soviet Union worked itself out of existence. Nothing of the kind could have happened without the ambitions of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Their rivalry was all-consuming and epic, and in the course of it they reinvented themselves, their country, and its beliefs. The United States had only to sigh with relief and applaud from the grandstand its own famous victory.

What to make of that victory was the most important foreign-policy issue facing Bill Clinton as president. Magnanimity in victory is of course wise, and triumph over a fallen foe likely to rebound. But what exactly was the standing of this newborn Russia, and what ought it to be? Were its sudden self-proclaimed reforms and pluralist values a reality or only another Kremlin-inspired deception? At the best of times Yeltsin was a rough and unpredictable customer, and he and many of his colleagues were veteran Communists. Could they be trusted? Should they be trusted? The success or failure of Clinton’s term in office depended to a great extent on the resolution of these hard questions.

About the Author

David Pryce-Jones

David Pryce-Jones (1936–2025) was a British author and commentator and served as a senior editor of National Review.

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THE ending of the Cold War was one of history’s great surprises. Involuntarily, as though in some sort of trance, the Soviet Union worked itself out of existence. Nothing of the kind could have happened without the ambitions of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Their rivalry was all-consuming and epic, and in the course of it they reinvented themselves, their country, and its beliefs. The United States had only to sigh with relief and applaud from the grandstand its own famous victory.

What to make of that victory was the most important foreign-policy issue facing Bill Clinton as president. Magnanimity in victory is of course wise, and triumph over a fallen foe likely to rebound. But what exactly was the standing of this newborn Russia, and what ought it to be? Were its sudden self-proclaimed reforms and pluralist values a reality or only another Kremlin-inspired deception? At the best of times Yeltsin was a rough and unpredictable customer, and he and many of his colleagues were veteran Communists. Could they be trusted? Should they be trusted? The success or failure of Clinton’s term in office depended to a great extent on the resolution of these hard questions.