The Islamic Republic of Holland

JUST days before the Dutch referendum on the proposed European constitution, a local political sociologist forecast a victory for the Noes. People were likely to reject Euro-initiatives, he argued, when they were angry about immigration, pessimistic about the economy, and hostile to the current government. All three factors were present in Holland. So . . . As it happened, the Noes did more than prevail; they won in a two-to-one landslide. It was a result that shocked the Dutch establishment, which had almost unanimously backed the constitution. The Euro-establishment across the continent, equally thunderstruck, has argued in mitigation that the Dutch voters did not really know what they were doing: They were not rejecting Europe but reacting to local political discontents. At first glance the sociologist’s prediction might seem to support this defense. A closer look, however, suggests that the Dutch were following a deep social instinct: They sensed that “Europe” was somehow connected to their other discontents, and were striking the only blow available to them. What links the EU constitution to anti-government sentiment, immigration, and economic pessimism is voter anger with elite-driven politics. European integration is generally admitted to be an elite project-the current cant phrase that it needs to be better “explained” to the masses makes that embarrassingly clear. High levels of (mainly Muslim) immigration and accompanying policies of multiculturalism are similarly regarded by elites as necessary steps towards a more diverse society. Most ordinary Dutch people were either opposed to or apathetic towards these social experiments. But the major parties favored them and the media preached them. That left voters with no obvious avenues of protest. And the issues did not intrude on their lives to the extent of rousing them to rebellion-until two atrocities occurred. Pim Fortuyn, the gay libertarian leader of a quirky anti-immigration party, was murdered by an assailant who cited Fortuyn’s opposition to large-scale Muslim immigration as his justification. Next, filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a Muslim extremist who objected to a film he had made attacking Islam for its hostility to women’s rights. These two murders sharpened the sense of many Dutch people that their country was being transformed in ways they disliked-and also made them unsafe.

Not only conservatives and traditionalists felt these fears. Liberals, feminists, and libertarians like Fortuyn who prized the tolerance, sexual equality, and libertinism of Dutch society were also made nervous. Unpolitical Dutch people voted with their feet. There had long been a “white flight” from schools and urban neighborhoods with large numbers of immigrants; now the Dutch began to emigrate in large numbers abroad.

About the Author

John O’Sullivan

John O’Sullivan is a senior fellow at National Review Institute and a contributing editor of National Review.

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JUST days before the Dutch referendum on the proposed European constitution, a local political sociologist forecast a victory for the Noes. People were likely to reject Euro-initiatives, he argued, when they were angry about immigration, pessimistic about the economy, and hostile to the current government. All three factors were present in Holland. So . . . As it happened, the Noes did more than prevail; they won in a two-to-one landslide. It was a result that shocked the Dutch establishment, which had almost unanimously backed the constitution. The Euro-establishment across the continent, equally thunderstruck, has argued in mitigation that the Dutch voters did not really know what they were doing: They were not rejecting Europe but reacting to local political discontents. At first glance the sociologist’s prediction might seem to support this defense. A closer look, however, suggests that the Dutch were following a deep social instinct: They sensed that “Europe” was somehow connected to their other discontents, and were striking the only blow available to them. What links the EU constitution to anti-government sentiment, immigration, and economic pessimism is voter anger with elite-driven politics. European integration is generally admitted to be an elite project-the current cant phrase that it needs to be better “explained” to the masses makes that embarrassingly clear. High levels of (mainly Muslim) immigration and accompanying policies of multiculturalism are similarly regarded by elites as necessary steps towards a more diverse society. Most ordinary Dutch people were either opposed to or apathetic towards these social experiments. But the major parties favored them and the media preached them. That left voters with no obvious avenues of protest. And the issues did not intrude on their lives to the extent of rousing them to rebellion-until two atrocities occurred. Pim Fortuyn, the gay libertarian leader of a quirky anti-immigration party, was murdered by an assailant who cited Fortuyn’s opposition to large-scale Muslim immigration as his justification. Next, filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a Muslim extremist who objected to a film he had made attacking Islam for its hostility to women’s rights. These two murders sharpened the sense of many Dutch people that their country was being transformed in ways they disliked-and also made them unsafe.

Not only conservatives and traditionalists felt these fears. Liberals, feminists, and libertarians like Fortuyn who prized the tolerance, sexual equality, and libertinism of Dutch society were also made nervous. Unpolitical Dutch people voted with their feet. There had long been a “white flight” from schools and urban neighborhoods with large numbers of immigrants; now the Dutch began to emigrate in large numbers abroad.