The Missing Memoranda 1962-1966

October 1964: The Air Force and the CIA: Who Says A, Must Say B

In early September, 1964, President Johnson appointed a special inter-departmental, inter-agency committee, referred to as OVERLOOK, to review the record of US activities in, and in relation to, Indochina from 1950 (the date of US recognition of Bao Dai, the first active intervention in the Indochinese conflict). The committee was instructed to submit its report and conclusions to the NSC prior to the end of the month, in conjunction with the new policy directives under discussion and due for decision in the first week of October. It was the normal practice of such committees, special or standing, as it was of the NSC, JCS, etc., to reach final agreement on a single report through discussion and, when necessary, compromise of any divergencies in viewpoint. In the case of OVERLOOK, however, two members—not named, but identified as from the Air Force and CIA—declined to endorse the report, and insisted on submitting a “minority” document, not so much disagreeing with the approved text as adding a further section. It is not clear whether this appendix was ever actually placed before the NSC or seen by the President.

Featured Tags

October 1964: The Air Force and the CIA: Who Says A, Must Say B

In early September, 1964, President Johnson appointed a special inter-departmental, inter-agency committee, referred to as OVERLOOK, to review the record of US activities in, and in relation to, Indochina from 1950 (the date of US recognition of Bao Dai, the first active intervention in the Indochinese conflict). The committee was instructed to submit its report and conclusions to the NSC prior to the end of the month, in conjunction with the new policy directives under discussion and due for decision in the first week of October. It was the normal practice of such committees, special or standing, as it was of the NSC, JCS, etc., to reach final agreement on a single report through discussion and, when necessary, compromise of any divergencies in viewpoint. In the case of OVERLOOK, however, two members—not named, but identified as from the Air Force and CIA—declined to endorse the report, and insisted on submitting a “minority” document, not so much disagreeing with the approved text as adding a further section. It is not clear whether this appendix was ever actually placed before the NSC or seen by the President.